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‘We have not yet properly understood the human cost tolled by the systems we have built to 
assuage our fears of uncertainty and the void. Nor the thick grip they have on us in 
consequence. Somewhere McLuhan says the old world was a world of roles and the modern 
world is a world of jobs. It is so because our systems demand our efforts and our beliefs for 
their continued maintenance and growth. We are conduits for them.  
 
Yet, as Blake divined at the birth pangs of the organizational society (is it only 200 years ago 
now?), we endure a profound psychic hurt in serving systems and not being allowed to find 
our own deep centers.’ 
 (Robert Cooper, The Open Field, 1976, p. 1015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     I dedicate this to my late grandmother Agnes (Jes) Ligthart-de Vries 
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Summary 
 In this thesis, the question is explored of how complexity theory can inform and challenge the study of organizations. Complexity theory researches complex social and natural systems and the phenomena to which they give rise, such as emergence, adaptiveness, self-organization and complexity. It has been suggested that (human) organizations are complex systems, being composed of many actors which, through local interactions, generate emergent behavior on the level of the organization as a whole. If this is true, it challenges many of the – implicit - assumptions we hold when thinking and writing about organizations. Drawing on complexity scholars and organization theorists such as Ralph Stacey, Paul Cilliers, and Edgar Morin, I analyze and critically evaluate (1) How complexity theory has been used in organizations studies so far (2) What theoretical and ethical consequences the insights from complexity theory hold for the way we think about organizations (3) What a theory of organization rooted in complexity studies could look like (4) How professionals working with organizations can develop an attitude that allows them to better deal with complexity in their practice. I conclude that complexity theory has important consequences for the way we think and work in organizations, proposing an approach which is not aimed at reducing complexity for those involved, but at engaging it from an attitude which is both modest and reflective. 
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Preface  
 
‘I wish I could have slipped surreptitiously into this discourse which I must present today. (…) 
I should have preferred to be enveloped by speech, and carried away well beyond all possible 
beginnings, rather than have to begin it myself. I should have preferred to become aware 
that a nameless voice was already speaking long before me, so that I should only have needed 
to join in, to continue the sentence it had started and lodge myself, without really being 
noticed, in its interstices, as if it had signaled to me by pausing, for an instant, in suspense. ‘ 
 These famous words, spoken by Michel Foucault at the beginning of ‘The Order of Discourse” (1970), have always seemed to me to be a proper reflection of the feeling one faces when undertaking the fool’s errand of writing something down, entering the moment where thought is arrested, meaning is transfixed, and the formless cloud of possibilities is subjected to organization. I have long been able to resist this process. But, as complexity theory teaches us, in complex systems the arrow of time moves irrevocably forward. And while this is a form of violence, it is violence also of the constitutive kind.  Writing a thesis is a lonely process. I count myself blessed because there were many prepared to walk part of the way with me. First and foremost I would like to thank my parents, for their love and commitment to my development. My thesis advisor, Prof. Dr. Alexander Maas, for his insight and his commitment to being there when he was needed. My co-advisor, Dr. Fernando Suárez Müller for providing excellent feedback in an impossible timeframe. My partner, Sylé van Olst, for her never-ending search for the balance of love and power. Eline Arisse and Dave de Bakker for all their help, both with content and process. Prof. Dr. Harry Kunneman, for suggesting the topic of this thesis and for his commitment to my growth as a person. And all those, both at the University of Humanistic Studies and elsewhere, who have inspired or touched me in some way.  For those whom I’ve neglected to include here: please consider the error to be mine, not yours. I realize that in writing about complexity, I’ve picked a topic which is neither simple nor uncontroversial, because it challenges some of the basic assumptions underlying both the discourses of organization studies and of humanism. That is to say, the possibility for a strong, autonomous individual to impose a benign order on both his own identity and the world around him. I suspect that if we are able to come to terms with the fact that such control may neither be fully possible nor desirable, we will be able to develop the attitude necessary to solve many of the global problems we are facing today.  
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Introduction    We live in a world which is an organized one. That is to say, most if not all of human experience is being shaped, mediated, or influenced by organization in some way. By organization, I refer both to the human capacity to impose order on the world, and the spaces and structures which both enable this and result from it, which are generally called organizations. Some refer to this process as organizing. (Weick, 1979, 1995; Van Dongen, De Laat en Maas, 1996). This organizing begins before birth and continues to well beyond the moment of death, since the fetus is already subjected to the logic of organized health care, meaning that questions of sickness and health are being structured by organization from before birth1, and the organization of the postmortem governs what happens to our deceased bodies. This ubiquity begs the question: “Why do we have (social) organization?” As far as I am aware, few attempts have been made to answer this question so far. What’s more, I suspect that for the casual reader, asking this question, especially in such general terms, will seem a bit absurd and perhaps even frivolous. After all, aren’t organizations implicitly considered to be a “natural feature” of human life? This seems to me to be testament to the paradigmatic dominance the idea of the need for organization enjoys. Though I would argue against positing a hard “conceptual split” between the natural and the organized, because this leads to the kind of dualistic logic which, in general, tends to be more limiting than conducive to understanding a phenomenon. For example, assuming that what is “natural” is good, and what is organized is bad, or vice versa. But there does seem to be an implicit assumption that organization as it pervades our lives today has always been there.  I would say that this assumption merits serious consideration. Although organizations have been a part of our lives since the beginning of recorded human history2, it seems to me that under the current conditions of late modernity, nearly all aspects of life have been brought within the sphere of the organized3. That is to say, when they appear, they appear in a way that is already mediated by organization. Meaning that they are represented as to-be-organized. And while the reasons for their organization may 
1 This can have strong consequences, for example in the case where parents are informed early about a birth defect with their child and hence are forced to decide whether to have an abortion or not. 2 Indeed, it has often been suggested that the transition from a culture based on oral transmission of knowledge to one based on writing was co-dependent with an increase in organization. Without the ability to quite literally take knowledge from out of our heads and put it into external objects, modern organization would be nigh impossible. 3 Referring to aforementioned examples of life and death, by the start of the 21st century, only about 20 to 25% of people in developed countries died outside of a medical institution, whereas before 1930, most people died in their own homes (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death#Society_and_culture). 
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indeed be compelling, in the dominant discourse the question of the “how” of organization tends to overshadow the “why”. In fact, asking about the “why” of organization is often presented as a venture into morally ambiguous terrain. Hence, questioning the “why” of organizations, especially when it is an intervention attempted (from) within organizations themselves, tends to meet with resistance.  One of the few authors who have attempted to question organization in this fundamental way, Mieke Moor (2012, p. 12-20), suggests that organizing as a process results from our deeply felt desire to bring order to the chaos that is inherent to life. We are, in a fundamental sense, always dependent on what might happen in each new moment. Yet, we often act as if we are in control of things (Ibid.). And, so she suggests, we are dependent on organization to propagate this fiction. Yet there is a kind of violence embedded within the process of organizing itself. This is the violence that inherent in every attempt to impose order on the world (Moor, 2012, p. 31), more so when such an attempt is presented in discourse as necessary and unproblematic, even when it is undertaken with best intentions in mind. I would like to illustrate this with an example. In childbirth, prospective mothers face a choice of either giving birth at a hospital or at home. Following the logic of the organization of health care, giving birth at a hospital is obviously a better choice. Because better care is available at a hospital than at home, it follows from this logic that women should prefer giving birth at a hospital. Choosing to give birth at home means exposing both mother and child to increased risks, making this a choice which is morally questionable. But though the statistics may support this, from the perspective of a prospective mother subjecting the process of natural childbirth to the logic of organized healthcare, i.e. “medicalizing” it, may tinge her experience of giving birth in a negative way, or be at odds with the values she considers important. To the extent that she decides giving birth at home outweighs the increase in medical risks. Nonetheless, professionals in medicine routinely claim, at least in Dutch media, that women should prefer giving birth at a hospital, portraying women that make a different choice as uninformed or naïve, or outright irresponsible.4 The question of the possible negative consequences of subjecting the process of giving birth to the medical-organizational regime has no place within this discourse. To pose the question of the “why” of organizing the experiences of these 
4 See for example http://medischcontact.artsennet.nl/archief-6/tijdschriftartikel/66482/van-thuisbevalling-naar-ziekenhuis.htm for an article aimed at Dutch general practitioners, suggesting providing pregnant  women with ‘better and more objective information’ (meaning expounding the risks of giving birth at home) will have them make better choices, thus making them “look back at one of their main life events with more satisfaction.”  Note the somewhat insidious logic employed here.  
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women, is to perform a questionable act. And people who do so are liable to get called out in public debate.  In cases such as this one, where a tension and interplay can be said to exist between different normative orientations (such as medical-rational normativity and the normativity of self-determination), the question of how the organization and the representation of life as to-be-organized bears on how this interplay is resolved becomes pertinent. For the field of humanistic studies, which aims to research how different normative orientations inform and influence the work of professionals (both in a descriptive and prescriptive sense), this question seems to me to be highly relevant. And having been schooled in the research tradition of critical organization and intervention studies,  I would like explore it in this thesis through focusing on the challenges to the existing discourse of organization studies which have emerged from a new field of science called complexity theory. Such research is relevant for the broader research program of humanistic studies, which asks questions about how we can live a good life within a just society and how the process of humanizing organizations and institutions can contribute to this. Taking into account the unprecedented ability we humans enjoy today to influence and shape the world around us, it can be argued that the ecological and economic crises we face today are, in many ways, dependent on and propagated by the process of organizing. It seems there are reasons to be ambiguous about the role of organization in our world. While organizations can be conducive to realizing the values considered important in human life (such as human dignity, justice, freedom and self-actualization), they can also stand in its way. I would argue that thinking from the logic of conventional organization tends to make us progress in a way that only takes in account the short and mid-time consequences of our actions. After all, within a radical economic or managerial logic, there is little reason for an organization to take more responsibility than the minimum required by law, despite the recent emergence of phenomena such as corporate social responsibility. It is evident today that many organizations propagate behavior that is focused only on what is economically useful in the short term, disregarding the negative consequences of their activities, such as the widespread environmental pollution and climate change we are facing today. There is a strong tendency to externalize ethical and normative questions arising from organizational behavior, relegating them to the domain of specialized committees or token individuals, sometimes taking them to be irrelevant altogether.  
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Progressing from this normative point of departure, it seems to me that the issues I have outlined above are highly relevant when it comes to studying organizations. Yet they are mostly absent in the existing literature within the field of organization studies (cf. Moor, 2012 p. 255 and Cooper, 2001, p. 326). I suspect that one of the reasons for this is that one of the underlying assumptions in the field of organization studies is that organizations can be thought of as rational, goal-oriented systems. Yet there is much evidence to the contrary. Take for instance, the statement by Boonstra (2004, as cited in Moor, 2012, p.14) that ‘more than 70% of planned organization changes fail’. This is more or less inconceivable in a system which is fully rational (i.e., based on analysis and strategies of optimization) and goal-oriented (set to work towards pre-defined goals), since this high failure rate would then have to be completely dependent on external and contingent factors. After all, a rational, goal-oriented system should be able to simply follow instructions indiscriminately, such as “from now on, perform x in a different way”.  Though there have been attempts to correct for the shortcomings of this model, it is still axiomatic in most organization theory (cf. Stacey, 2007). Consequently, contemporary organization theory may well be unable to fully account for phenomena such as the undecidability or unpredictability of the world, the ambiguity of human behavior, the a-moral position taken by many organizations (the tendency to externalize ethical issues), and resistance to change. This is problematic both with regards to developing an understanding of how organizations work, and when it comes to being an actor who aims, in his practice, to making organizations better places in which to live and work; a normative professional working in organizations. By contrast to the dominant model used in organization studies, a new science has been in development since about the nineteen seventies called complexity theory or complexity science. I will use these terms more or less interchangeably here, since the development of complexity “theory” is part of doing complexity “science”. Amongst other topics, it focuses on order and organization as it develops spontaneously (emerges), both in natural and social systems. It performs research into the conditions under which such organization occurs and has so far shown that much of the higher-order organization in the natural and social worlds is a result of the particular characteristics of complex systems that allow them to respond adaptively to changing circumstances.  It has often been suggested (cf. Stacey, 1992, 2003, 2007; Lissack, 2002; Maguire et 
al., 2006; Chia, 1998a; Marion, 1999) that complexity science is relevant for the field of organization studies, because, given the way that organizations function, they seem to display many if not all of the characteristics of complex systems, such as self-organization, 
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complexity and emergence. If organizations are or function as complex systems, it may be possible to better understand their behavior through using the “lens” of complexity theory. Complexity theory may allow for filling some of the theoretical gaps in organization studies, such as those I have outlined above. Perhaps the naturally occurring organization patterns complexity science has shown to be evident in nature can shed light on how human organization (imposing our order on the world that is already “out there”) should be approached, if we want to be able to better deal with the ethical ambiguity organizations produce. This is at least what thinkers within the field of critical complexity theory (cf. Morin, 2008; Cilliers, 1998 and 2008) suggest. 
 
Research topic  Hence, the question I will address in this thesis is how complexity science can inform the study of organizations. I would like to know whether complexity theory can help us develop a theory of organization that does more justice to the phenomena it seeks to describe (descriptive), avoiding the flaws in the organizational model Stacey suggests are dominant in most organization theories. And also whether such a theory or development of a “complex understanding” of organizations can be used to provide guidelines for how normative professionals can develop and use a “complex understanding” of organizations and develop ways of dealing with complexity in their daily practice (prescriptive). I will try to approach these questions from a position that is critical in a double sense. Critical towards existing organization theory, because the literature in the field of critical management studies shows that there are many blind spots within the current field of organization studies for which complexity theory can possibly point to answers. But also critically evaluating the way in which complexity theory has been used in organization studies so far. Some authors have cautioned against faddism when it comes to using complexity theory in organization studies; complexity theory may well be on its way to become the next “management fad” (cf. Lissack, 2002).  There are also epistemological issues. Since complexity theory is rooted in the natural sciences, resting in part on a basis of empirical research from those disciplines, is it possible to apply these concepts to social systems such as organizations in a more-than metaphorical way, without resting on a similar basis? Furthermore, I will also discuss the ethical questions complexity theory poses and attempt to provide some guidelines which are useful for normative professionals working with organizations. 
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Research objectives  Theoretical relevance: to contribute to the research about how complexity theory can inform and challenge existing organization theories.  Practical relevance: to help normative professionals working in and with organizations develop a complexity-based understanding and attitude, in order to work towards the “good life within a just society.”  
Main research question 
 
How can complexity theory be used to inform and/or challenge the study of organizations? 
 
Sub questions 
 
- What are the core ideas from the field of complexity science, and in what way are 
they relevant for the field of organization studies? 
- What strategies have researchers used to apply ideas and methods from complexity 
science to the study of organizations? What could a theory of organization grounded 
in complexity science look like? 
- How can professionals working with organizations, using insights from  critical 
complexity theory, develop an attitude that allows them to better deal with 
complexity in practice? 
 
Research methodology 
 The method used for this research is that of a (comparative) literature study, exploring different authors’ views on how complexity theory relates to organizations and combining this with philosophical research methods such as discourse analysis. I believe this research method is best suited to answer the research questions I have posed for several reasons. First, my main research question has as its subject the relationship between two fields of science, exploring how theorists have tried to bring concepts and ideas from one field into another. For such a (meta-scientific) question, theoretical (literature) research is more suitable than an empirical approach. Secondly, since complexity theory is a relatively young field of science with roots in different disciplines, there is as of yet no unified 
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theoretical framework defining complexity in social systems, which would, for example, render the rigorous operationalization of concepts possible. Many questions exist that need to be explored further theoretically. For example, there is no consensus on fundamental questions such as whether complexity is an ontological or epistemological property of systems, and whether concepts from complexity theory have a universality that allows them to be used across scientific disciplines. And thirdly, since I approach this research from a critical-humanistic position towards existing management theory and with a sensitivity towards the ethical and normative questions at play in the work of organization professionals, discourse analysis (that is to say, researching and questioning the fundamental assumptions underlying the discourse of a scientific field, such as organization studies) seems indicated. This also means I will attempt to answer my final sub-question from a prescriptive viewpoint, rather than following an empirical-descriptive path. The organization of this thesis is as follows: I will first examine the origins and key themes of the research into complex systems, focusing on their ontological and epistemological aspects, and on how topics from this research relate to the study of organizations. After that, I will explore the different ways in which scholars have attempted to use concepts and methods from complexity science in the study of organizations, giving an overview of the field, discussing the problematic aspects of this type of research, and focusing on the work of Ralph Stacey, an author whose ideas I consider particularly promising. I will reflect on the consequences of his work for existing theories of organization, followed by outlining and critically evaluating his own theory of Complex Responsive Processes (CRP). I will conclude with an exploration of how a complexity-based understanding of organizations can inform the attitude of normative professionals, using insights from critical complexity theory to develop a set of guidelines for those working in or with organizations. Since the attempts that have been made so far to bring ideas from complexity theory to the field of organization studies are by no means exhaustive, what is presented in this last part of my thesis must needs be more tentative. This is followed by a conclusion in which I sum up the results of my research and present answers to the questions posited here. 
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Chapter 1: Introducing complexity theory 
 In this chapter I will provide a short introduction into complexity science. Because of the limited space available for this exploration and the broad character of the field, I will describe its origins and development only in short. Since I am setting the stage for the later parts of this thesis, in which the relationship between complexity theory and organization theory is explored, I will explore complexity theory mostly as it is used in the study of social systems. I choose to begin with a general introduction into complexity theory, as opposed to only describing complexity as it has been applied to the study of organizations, for two reasons. First, complexity theory is a field of science that is still relatively new (some have called it nascent) and progressing from ontological and epistemological presuppositions that differ from those of conventional science. Thus, an introduction in some detail is in order. Secondly, it has been suggested (cf. Stacey, 2007, p. 213) that the way in which organization theorists have tried to bring complexity theory into their field so far has not done full justice to its inherently challenging and transformative character, interpreting complexity through a reductionist strategy instead. In order to be able to see whether this claim is valid, it is necessary to not set out from a concept of complexity that has already been brought to the discourse of organization studies.  
1.1: Complexity theory – origins and fields 
 According to Maguire, McKelvey, Mirabeau & Öztas, complexity theory is ‘the study of complexity and complex systems and of the phenomena of complexity and emergence to which they give rise.’ (2006, p. 167). Complexity is defined by most scientists in the field as a naturally occurring property of many social and natural systems, which can consequently be called complex systems. Another term often used is Complex Adaptive System (CAS). These terms can be used interchangeably, since, as I will explain further onward, the fact that they are adaptive is a key characteristic of complex systems. Complexity theory has origins in many different disciplines, such as biology, economics, mathematics and physics, but it has since emerged as a scientific field of its own. (Ibid.). In the view of Maguire et al.(Ibid.) there is a European and a North American tradition of complexity. The European school was sparked by a 1955 publication by the Nobel Prize winning chemist Ilya Prigogine. In this tradition, the emphasis is on studying so called “far-from-equilibrium” conditions or “non-equilibrium systems”, showing how unorganized entities within such a system can spontaneously organize themselves into structures when they are subjected to an external energy source. For instance, if a cup of 
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water is being heated by an external energy source, the behavior of the water molecules in the cup becomes less random. Streams of hotter and colder water start moving within a geometric pattern. This may be described as a spontaneous process of self-organization: order emerges from disorder. (Ibid.) The structures Prigogine describes have been termed “dissipative structures”, because the dissipation in such a system, which is to say the loss of energy, does not result in it breaking up or being destroyed, as is to be expected. Rather, the loss of energy is part of a process in which a system reorganizes into a different form which is better suited to its changed environment. (Wheatley, 1999 in: Brown, 2004, p.19) This means that in complex systems, disequilibrium is, to an extent, necessary for growth (Ibid.) The behavior of such systems is, in part, decided by their “boundary conditions”, which is to say the environmental factors interacting with the system. Whereas in a system based in equilibrium, the behavior of the system is mostly determined by its initial state (Ibid.).  Given the influence of boundary conditions on their behavior, dissipative complex systems are in part both self-determining and dependent. I will return to the topic of self-determination or self-organization later in this chapter. When considering the consequences of the concept of order resulting from disequilibrium in social systems such as organizations, we can say that there is a dependency between the internal and external environment of the system. When something occurs that disturbs the order or (temporary) “stable state” of the system, this will result in self-organization into a new form of order (Ibid.) Through the exchange between the internal and external, information and resources continually flow in and out (dissipation), causing the system to either adapt and re-organize itself or break up. Some have gone as far as describing it as “order for free.” This may have important consequences for the question of how change and development occur in organizations.  The North American school of complexity, as Maguire et al. call it, is rooted in the work of scientists such as Benoit Mandelbrot and John Holland. It is often associated with the Santa Fe Institute, a private research institution dedicated to the development of complexity science. It draws mostly from the life sciences, studying the spontaneous co evolution of entities within complex systems. In these complex biological systems, agents are continuously restructuring themselves, which leads to new forms of emergent order and evolved agent attributes (Maguire et al., 2006, p. 167) This has been observed both in empirical studies and through analytical tools, such as agent-based computer models (ABM’s).  Both ‘schools’ have been developing since the nineteen seventies onward and have gradually been expanding into other fields of science, such as evolutionary biology, 
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philosophy, economics  and computer science, studying complex systems as they occur within these fields. There have also been, roughly since the mid-nineteen nineties, attempts to bring insights derived from complexity theory to the social sciences, such as organization studies. I should mention that, judging from the current literature in the complexity sciences, in general no clear distinction is made between the “schools” proposed by Maguire et al. I would argue that the distinction does not refer to a fundamental difference in research outlook or epistemological tenets.   As I will explain later in this chapter, the fact that complexity is defined as an inherent property of certain natural and social systems raises important ontological and epistemological questions, because these systems exhibit certain behavior that seem to contradict some of the basic axioms of modern science. According to some, such as Morin (2006, p. 1) and Marion (1999, p. 41), the existence of complex systems challenges the classic Newtonian notion of causality, as well as the reductionist method that is at the heart of conventional science. Reductionism refers to the epistemological position that a whole can be broken into different parts which can then be researched in isolation, in order to understand the functioning of the whole. 
 
1.2: What is complexity? Objective or metaphorical  There is no universally agreed upon definition of what complexity is. Most theorists agree that it is a spontaneously occurring property of a system, either natural or social. A system can be defined broadly as ‘a whole separated by a boundary from other systems, or wholes’ (Stacey, 2007, p. 34). But what defines a system as complex? Maguire et al. describe a complex system as: ‘a whole comprised of a large number of parts, each of which behaves according to some rule or force that relates it interactively to other parts. In responding in parallel to their own local contexts, the parts can, without explicit inter-part co-ordination or any one of them having a global view, cause the system as a whole to display emergent patterns at the global level – the emergence of orderly phenomena and properties of the whole that cannot be predicted from properties of parts.’ (Maguire et al., 2006, p. 166) From this description, several important properties of complex systems can be glanced. First, that in order for complexity to arise, a system has to consist of many parts that function individually, but interact with other parts. Secondly, that depending on the level of scale that is chosen by the person observing or describing the system, something different comes into view. What can be described on a smaller scale as the properties and  
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response patterns of parts, which are embedded in local interactions, appears as new and different patterns and properties when viewed on a larger scale. These patterns and properties of a “whole” are often emergent. Emergent in this sense means that we cannot predict them from properties of its parts. (Ibid., p. 166) And thirdly, that these emergent patterns can arise without any intentional inter-part co-ordination or overview. No “grand plan” or teleological property is necessary on the level of a “whole” for properties to arise from the level of parts.  Maguire et al. (Ibid.) also mention several other aspects associated with complex systems. The interactions among parts can be based on the exchange of materials and energy and/or information. They are often characterized by non-linearity: small changes in one variable in a system, can have a disproportionately large effect on a different variable. This means that complex systems tend to be sensitive to initial conditions. The famous “butterfly effect” described by Lorentz is an example of this.5 Also, complex systems have a history. They are capable of retaining information, and their further evolution over time tends to be strongly determined by their previous conditions; their past is still co-producing their present (Ibid.). They also tend to have an open relationship with their environments; being both produced by and co-producing their surroundings through exchanging matter, energy and information. Maguire et al. (Ibid.) suggest that there are many different systems, both natural and social, that conform to these characteristics. Examples given by them include the human immune system, ecosystems and the global economy, which all exhibit signs of complexity. To further define what a complex system is and what is not, I would like to refer to some remarks made by critical complexity theorist Paul Cilliers. Cilliers (1998, p.  2-3) explains that many systems may appear simple from a distance, but reveal their complexity when viewed closer. An example of this is a leaf. While on the other hand there are systems that appear complex, but can be described in a simple way, such as an internal combustion engine. (Ibid.) Cilliers makes a distinction between systems that are actually complex, and systems that are simply complicated. A snowflake for instance, or a CD player, is a very intricate and complicated system, but it doesn’t display the kind of properties complexity entails. Its behavior can be completely predicted from the properties of its parts; there is no novelty or emergence occurring. While on the other hand, systems like the human brain and the economic system exhibit these qualities in 
5 Lorentz suggests that in a nonlinear system such as the weather, one butterfly flapping its wings can, through myriad interactions, eventually result in a hurricane occurring thousands of miles away. 
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abundance.6 (Ibid.) And consequently, do not lend themselves to simple understanding and prediction. For Cilliers, complexity remains a concept that is ‘elusive at both the qualitative and quantitative levels’ (Ibid.). He therefore proposes giving an analysis of characteristics typical of complex systems, instead of developing a constraining a priori definition. I agree with Cilliers that it may be impossible and perhaps even unnecessary to develop such a definition, given the large variety of complex systems that exists. Cilliers offers a list of ten properties of complex systems (Cilliers, 1998, p. 3), which can be used in delineating what is a complex system and what is not:   ‘ 1. Complex systems consist of a large number of elements. 2. These elements interact dynamically (e.g. they change with time) 3. Interactions are rich; element in the system can influence or be influenced by many others. 4. Interactions are non-linear. Cilliers describes this as a precondition for complexity. 5. Interactions between elements are typically short-range; information is received primarily from immediate neighbours7.  6. There are positive and negative feedback loops of interactions; the effect of any activity can feed back on itself and either reinforce or dampen the activity. 7. Complex systems are usually open systems (to their environment, JL) 8. Complex systems operate under conditions far from equilibrium. This means there has to be a constant flow of energy to maintain the organization and survival of the system. Equilibrium (or homeostasis) eventually means death. 9. Complex systems have histories. 10. Individual elements are typically ignorant of the behavior of the whole system in which they are embedded.’  I would also like to mention that complexity is not a property that can be located at a specific site within a system. Since it arises from and is dependent on the interaction between the parts of a system, it manifests itself at the level of the whole. Complexity as a property cannot be reduced to specific elements of a system, unless these elements are complex subsystems themselves. (Maguire et al., 2006:166).  In fact, Doolittle (1999, cited 
6 Which, incidentally, may be one of the reasons why it is so much easier to build a working CD player than it is to predict an economic crisis, or cure a disease such as Alzheimer’s. 7 This does still allow information or energy to be rapidly dispersed throughout a system; because there is a rich interaction between parts, even long distances can often be crossed quickly 
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in Brown 2004, p. 24) suggests that what emerges as characteristics of a particular complex system often forms the individual agents within a complex system at a higher level. Furthermore, these higher level structures and “meta-agents” also influence the lower level agents and their interaction again (Ibid.), resulting in complex and unpredictable structures of causality. This has important consequences for how we study complexity. The act of representing a complex system, and thereby reducing its complexity, always runs the risk of losing sight of this complexity. I will explore this issue further in the following paragraph and the third chapter. The elements in a system do respond interactively to the information that is available locally, but individual elements are not conscious of the “whole”. As Cilliers explains, for an element to know what was happening to the system as a whole, all complexity of the system would have to be present within that element itself. This would be a physical impossibility, because a single element would not have the capacity to store that much information. Hence, making the assertion that the “consciousness of the whole” is contained in its parts, as some complexity theorists have done, would be a metaphysical move. (Cilliers, 1998, p. 4) Complexity however, is not dependent on any inherently metaphysical properties. The rich interactions between the elements of a complex system are sufficient to explain the emergent behavior at the level of the whole.  Cilliers also points to the importance of the “level” from which the description of a system is being made, when trying to identify it as complex or not. Depending on the level of analysis chosen, the complexity present may be missing altogether in our description (model) of the system. However, according to Cilliers, this does not mean that complexity is simply a function of the way in which we describe a system, as some have argued, since complex systems ‘do have characteristics that are not merely determined by the point of view of the observer’. (Ibid., p. 3)    1.3: Complexity and self-organization  One aspect that is often mentioned in the literature about complex systems is that they show a propensity towards self-organization. As Cilliers (1998, p. 89) mentions, self-organization refers to the fact that in complex systems, ‘internal structure can evolve without the intervention of an external designer or the presence of some centralized form of internal control.’ The evolution of this structure results from a complex interaction between the history of a system, its current state, and the influences of the environment. It should be noted that generally, such changes in internal structure occur for a system to be 
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able to better cope with, or influence, its environment (Ibid., p. 90). This means that complex systems are adaptive. As an example, Cilliers mentions a school of fish. While a school of fish consists of many individual “agents”, the size of the school itself is influenced by many factors such as the availability of food, the temperature of the environment, the availability of oxygen, et cetera. If these variables change, the size of the school will adjust itself to the new characteristics. Depending on past conditions, the school will be more or less sensitive to such changes. The current structure of the school can be more or less “robust”. This means that at the level of the system, the school exhibits adaptive self-organizing behavior in order to achieve a better “fit” with external circumstances, despite the fact that the individual fish are unable to grasp the complexity of the situation. The organization of the school ‘emerges as a result of the interaction between the various constituents of the system and its environment.’ (Cilliers, 1998 p. 90) A second example given by Cilliers is again that of the brain. The development of the human brain is complex. Starting from a limited number of “programs”, it needs to learn how to cope with external circumstances, gradually developing an increasingly deeper understanding of its environment, learning how to influence it and deal with its constraints. From the perspective of our consciousness this process is automatic. We cannot consciously supervise it. But in order for our brains to be able to process and store information, they are continually developing new and removing old connections between neurons. This organization and reorganization occurs in interaction with external and internal influences, such as input in the form of oxygen, energy, and electro-chemical impulses coming from the senses. This means our brains show a tendency toward self-organization, continually creating and removing connections between neurons in order to adapt to demands from the environment. Cilliers gives a non-exhaustive list of general attributes of self-organizing systems. He asserts that although the full set of characteristics is not present in all of them, the more complex a system is, the more of these characteristics will be present. (Ibid., p. 91):  ‘1. The structure of the system is not the result of an a priori design, or determined directly by external conditions. It is a result of interaction between the system and its environment. 2. The internal structure of the system can adapt dynamically to changes in the environment, even if these changes are not regular 
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3. Self-organization is not merely the result of processes like feedback or regulation that can be described linearly. It involves higher-order non-linear processes that cannot be modelled by sets of linear differential equations. (…) 4. Self-organization is an emergent property of a system as a whole. The system’s individual components only operate on local information and general principles. (…) 5. Self-organizing systems increase in complexity. Since they have to ‘learn’ from experience, they have to ‘remember’ previously encountered situations and compare them with new ones. If more ‘previous information’ can be stored, the system will be able to make better comparisons. (…) 6. Self-organization is impossible without some form of memory (…). Without memory, the system can do no better than merely mirror the environment. A self-organizing system therefore always has a history. (…) 7. Since the self-organizing process is not guided or determined by specific goals, it is often difficult to talk about the function of such a system. As soon as we introduce the notion of function, we run the risk either of anthropomorphizing, or of introducing an external reason for the structure of the system, exactly those aspects we are trying to avoid. (…) 8.  Similarly, it is not possible to give crudely reductionistic descriptions of self-organizing systems. Since microscopic units do not ‘know’ about large-scale effects, while at the same time these effects manifest themselves in collections that do not involve anything besides these microscopic units, the various ‘levels’ of the system cannot be given independent descriptions. The levels are in principle intertwined. The resistance to using a reductionist discourse when describing emergent properties does not, however, imply any resistance to materialist principles.’  Self-organization, as described here, seems in some ways to be a paradoxical concept. Because when we start thinking about organization, especially within social systems such as organizations, we immediately start thinking about an “organizer” as well. This argument is more or less analogous to the arguments used by the proponents of so-called “intelligent design”. Given the intricacies or effectiveness of certain systems, isn’t it evident that there must be some kind of anthropomorphic designer who is responsible for it, either through direct influence or through setting a “blueprint” for the system to follow? As Van Uden (2004, p. 81) notes, these kinds of arguments are seductive, but there is no compelling reason to accept them. We know that, given suitable preconditions, organic matter has the ability to organize itself. It is possible, therefore, to conceive of ‘an organized structure that comes into being without conscious intervention’ (Ibid.). 
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Although an energy and-or matter exchange with the environment seems to be a precondition for a system to exhibit self-organization, no sentience of the animal or human kind is necessary. In fact, looking at the world around us, it seems that self-organization is present in natural systems everywhere. And most of them are not directly being determined or influenced by humans. When we look at human organizations through this lens, it seems that their behavior may also, to a degree, be independent of an externally imposed teleology. I would also like to reiterate Cilliers point that in talking about self-organization, we should be careful in using the notion of function. Although complex systems do self-organize in order to adapt to their environment, this does not mean they do this in order to perform a specific function. Van Uden describes this way of thinking as ‘the Official presumption of functionality – the idea that organization is always there for some external reason.’ (Ibid.) This line of thought may hold some important consequences for thinking about organizations, since these are, in much or organizational literature, taken to be rational, goal-oriented systems.  In order to further clarify self-organization, and the way in which it challenges our ideas about organization, I would like to refer to Aristotle’s distinction between four different types of causality. Aristotle makes a distinction between the causa materialis (the physical cause of a thing, such as the stones used to build a house), the causa formalis (the form-giving cause, such as the design or blueprint according to which the house is built), the causa efficiens (the working cause, such as the person who is building the house), and the causa finalis (the ultimate goal or telos of a thing, which for a house would be shelter and protection). I would argue that in the self-organization which exists in complex systems the causa formalis, which is the type of causality we tend to consider most important, loses center stage. It only appears “after the fact” so to speak, as a result of the interplay between the causa materialis and causa efficiens. That is to say, it is through local interactions (causa materialis) of individual agents (causa efficiens) that the patterns of organization emerge which are visible at the level of the whole (causa formalis). These then feed back into the system again. Likewise, the causa finalis, which is the concept of functionality to which Cilliers and Van Uden refer, would only become visible after the fact, being generated by the way in which the individual agents of the system try to make sense of these patterns. As Cilliers also mentioned, the behavior of a self-organizing complex system is highly sensitive to its boundary conditions. Since it operates under far-from-equilibrium conditions, a continual exchange of energy and information with its environment is 
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necessary for it to maintain its existence. Consequently, homeostasis (a continuing condition of stable equilibrium) equals death, since the system will no longer be able to adapt to changes in its environment. In fact, when current conditions in a system are disturbed, this can assist the system in self-organizing itself into a new form of order (Ibid.). Matthews et al. (1999, cited in Brown, 2004, p. 20) provide an explanation of the steps by which self-organization in complex systems occurs as the result of dissipative processes:  1. After increasing disequilibrium within a system, it will eventually reach a single bifurcation point. 2. At the point of bifurcation, the system can either continue trying to dampen its increasing oscillations (which will eventually lead to the decline and failure of the system), or engage in a process of transformation by “exploring alternative existences.” 3. Through a period of experimenting with alternative behaviors and structures 4. A resynthesis and reformulation around a new structure can be achieved. (Ibid.)  Although the new structure of the system will be able to withstand increasing disequilibrium for a time, eventually the new equilibrium will fail to align with its environment, prompting a new adaptation through re-organization. Consequently, it has been argued that what makes a system complex and capable of self-organization is not so much its form or function, but its process structures that allow it to maintain its existence across a wide range of boundary conditions (Ibid., p. 21). This process acts as a kind of selection pressure, where those systems that are able to adapt successfully perform better with regards to their environment (achieving a better “fit”), thus linking complexity theory to biology. (Ibid., p. 22).  It can be argued that this holds true for organizations, which are also required today to continually re-organize themselves in order to adapt to changing circumstances. One key difference however, is that where in organization studies, change tends to be conceptualized as a process of implementing top-down, rationally chosen strategies decided upon by (top) executives (cf. Stacey, 2007, p. 415), in a perspective informed by complexity theory, change occurs also in ways that are unpredictable and non-teleological. Furthermore, the behavior patterns that result in these changes could originate from any place in the organization. 
22 
 
1.4: Complexity, causality and classical science  According to some, the discovery of complexity as a property of systems also challenges our notion of causality. Marion (1999, p. 40) for instance, asserts that since the Enlightenment, a Newtonian conception of causality has come to dominate both modern science and life in general. The core of this conception is simple: event A causes event B, event B is proportionally related to A, and any event can be attributed to something. (Ibid.) Marion suggests that we tend to have the assumption that ‘events can be linearly attributed to simple causes’ (Ibid.), even in questions which are not directly within the scope of natural science. For instance, a question such as ‘Why do people riot?’ betrays a search for a linear explanation or answer, while a social phenomenon like a riot is the result of  a complex interaction between many different variables. Many social events cannot be adequately described in terms of simple causation (Ibid., p. 41) Marion contrasts the linear or “simple” conception of causation with “circular causation”, where order is described as the eventual product of many interactions (Ibid.) Since complexity theory shows that in complex systems, new patterns of behavior can emerge at a higher level – a nonlinear phenomenon – from many linear interactions at a lower level, it follows that the interactions themselves cause social systems to have a “life of their own”, displaying properties such as emergence and self-organization. The notion that all events have a predictable cause, or causes, is broken. (Ibid.)  The consequences of this for our understanding of human behavior and social systems, such as organizations, still need to be more fully understood. The recent Dutch phenomenon of “Project X Haren” is an interesting example of this. What started out as a teenage girl creating an event for her birthday party on Facebook and inviting some friends escalated into riots which vandalized an entire town. Yet thousands of Dutch teenage girls post their parties on Facebook each day. This begs the question: why did so many people decide to come to Haren that day and “crash” her party? Linear causation may be able to explain some of the processes at work here, such as the fact that news media widely reported that large amounts of random Facebook users jokingly posted they would attend the party. This generated massive interest among those who were not yet aware of it. But it cannot explain why events escalated specifically at this party instead of at another. It seems that there are many unknown variables interplaying here, from which the phenomenon of a large-scale riot emerged at a “higher level of analysis.” This example illustrates how a scientific paradigm based around Newtonian, linear causation is unable to explain complex emergent phenomena in social systems, much less predict them.  
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As Marion (1999, p. 41) remarks, ‘one may be the source of information that leads to a rumor, but the social phenomenon that evolves about that information is an emergent, self-organizing entity.’ It we take this seriously, it seems that we need to consider social systems such as organization to have a “life of their own”. Another important theorist focusing on complexity and how it requires us to rethink basic epistemological assumptions, is Edgar Morin. He is considered to be one of the fathers of complexity theory. Morin writes that classical science has rejected complexity, choosing reductionism instead, because of three explanatory principles ‘ 1. Universal determinism: all events are caused linearly by events preceding them 2. The principle of reduction: any composite can be understood only from knowledge of its basic constituting elements 3. The principle of disjunction: isolating and separating cognitive difficulties from each other in order to solve them, leading to a separation between scientific disciplines’ (Morin, 2006, p. 1)  According to Morin, together these form a “paradigm of simplification”, that is dependent on the Cartesian split between res cogitans and res extensa, that is to say the “thinking object” and the “thing being thought of”. In essence, this means disjoining philosophy and science and positing distinctive, isolated ideas - that is to say, what Morin calls disjunctive thought - as the principles of reality (Morin, 2008 p. 3). At the same time, within the Cartesian and Newtonian logic, a perfect order is posited, that regulates the apparent complexity of phenomena from behind the scenes (Ibid., p. 4). Through the specialization of the sciences that followed from this logic, a belief that the fragmentation of reality was reality itself came to dominate. This is known as the fallacy of reification, which Maas (1988, p. 13) defines as ‘taking certain definitions provided in literature and practice to be a given, a “facticity”’, freezing the reflection on whether they are factual or not. Morin’s objection to what he calls ‘simple thought’ is that it is limited to either reducing phenomena to abstractions, thereby canceling out diversity, or positing diversity without conceiving of unity (Ibid.).  By contrast, complexity theory shows that many phenomena cannot be adequately described using these principles. Applying the principle of reduction in order to analyze complexity or complex systems is bound to fail, because it cannot account for the many 
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interactions between parts that are co-constitutive of the whole. The behavior of higher-order elements cannot be predicted from the interaction of lower-order elements.   Morin proposes a difference between “restricted complexity”, such as that used in the natural complexity sciences, and “generalized complexity”. Whereas in restricted complexity, one attempts to “decomplexify” complex phenomena by trying to define them in terms of underlying patterns and universal principles, generalized complexity involved a rethinking of fundamental ideas about what knowledge is, such as the possibility of a split between subject and object. Hence, Morin proposes an epistemological rethinking towards a paradigm of “generalized complexity”. Such a paradigm would state that phenomena can only be understood by comprehending the relationship between the whole and the parts. Having knowledge of either is not enough. Instead, it is necessary to “come and go” between the whole and its parts in a loop. (Morin, 2006, p. 6) Morin writes that the principle of reduction should be substituted by a principle that focuses on the relation between whole and parts and their mutual implications. The principle of separation should be substituted by a principle that maintains a distinction, but tries to establish a relation. (Ibid., p. 7). What this means in practice is not completely clear, although I would argue that this is caused in part by the difficulties inherent to trying to define a new scientific paradigm in terms of an older one.  There are those with a different view, however. Complexity theory has been accused of simply ‘mystifying’ epistemological issues, proposing a new scientific paradigm that is not really necessary. It has been suggested that complexity is simply a term used to describe the problems that are inherent to describing a system and trying to make accurate predictions about its behavior (cf. Maguire et al., 2006 p. 170).  Should this be the case, then complexity theory may simply be a reiteration of the age-old problem of representing reality within science. That is to say, that it is fundamentally difficult to model reality, because our knowledge of all the variables at play – both what they are and what their state is – is never complete. If this is true, there would be no qualitative difference between the principles that govern the behavior of the aforementioned snowflake and those that govern the human brain. If we were to know all the variables of either in isolation, we would still end up with a system in which all behavior can be explained by linear causal loops.  Maguire et al. (Ibid.) however suggest that the emerging consensus in the field is that complexity is both an objective and ontological property of a system and an epistemological property of the way in which a system is being represented or interpreted. They mention that in defining complexity, understanding and “choosing” what is defined 
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as information within a system (as opposed to redundant “noise”) plays a key role. Creating a representation of reality is always a political matter. (Ibid.) Even for natural scientists, selecting a scale of observation and analysis for a complex system means focusing on specific elements and obfuscating others. In the social sciences this issue is even more vital, because researchers are often part of the systems they are studying. In chapter 2 I will discuss these issues in more detail when describing critical complexity. 
 
1.5: Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have tried to answer the question “What are the core ideas from the field of complexity science, and in what way are they relevant for the field of organization studies?”  There are several ideas at the core of complexity science which are relevant for the study of organizations. First, that in complex systems, dis- or nonequilibrium is a precondition for growth. That is to say, when the stable conditions in a complex system are disturbed through outside influences, the system will re-organize itself in order to achieve a better “fit” with its environment. This seems to happen in organizations when they re-organize their internal structure from time to time, in order to better meet outside demands. Secondly, that complex systems are open to their environment. They exchange matter and energy, being in part constitutive of their environment and being constituted by it. This is also evident in organizations, since they influence the environment in which they function, for instance developing new behavior which other organizations then follow. Thirdly, complex systems display emergent behavior. The patterns of their behavior at the level of their “whole” tends to be generated by local interactions on the level of their parts. But what  these patterns will be, cannot, from the level of the parts, be predicted. This is also evident in organizations, since many organization theories focus on the unpredictable character of much of organizational behavior. Fourthly, complex systems display self-organization. That is to say, their ‘internal structure can evolve without the intervention of an external designer or the presence of some centralized form of internal control’ (Cilliers, 1998, p. 89). This also seems evident in organizations since, although in many organizations managers are presumed to be in control, the way in which their internal structures develop is also influenced by many contingent factors, for example, the way in which new, successful behavior of individual actors is copied by other ones, and then runs as a ripple throughout the organization. To explore these possibilities further,  I will research how the insights from complexity theory have been used in the field of organization studies in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 2: Bringing complexity theory into organization studies 
 In this chapter, I set out to describe how scholars have tried to take concepts and ideas originating from complexity theory and apply them to the study of organizations. I will begin by giving an overview of how organization theorists have incorporated complexity to various extents, describing different theoretical approaches to complexity in organizations. I will then discuss some of the epistemological questions inherent to bringing complexity to organization studies. After this, I will explore the main question of this thesis, how complexity theory can inform and challenge organization theory, through the work of organizational theorist Ralph Stacey in some detail. Why Stacey? Because he   
- provides a comprehensive account of how what complexity theory teaches us provides a challenge to existing ways of thinking about organizations and the shared assumptions implicit in their discourse.  
- explores existing approaches to using complexity theory in organization studies from a critical-reflexive and normative point of view. 
- has developed his own theory of organization based on complexity science, providing an interesting point of departure for approaching the final question of this thesis: how can professionals working with organizations develop an attitude that allows them to work with complexity in practice?  Nonetheless, I will also discuss the way in which his theories have been criticized, describing where they may be lacking. I will also use Stacey’s theories to provide part of the answer to my final sub-question. 
 
2.1: Complexity science in organization studies – mapping the field  
 As I’ve noted in the preceding chapter, there is as of yet no unified theory of complexity proper. Rather, complexity science as a field contains concepts and ideas that are interpreted differently depending on the field to which they are being applied (e.g. social sciences, biology, physics etc.). This is also true of the study of complexity as it applies to organizations. Different approaches can be identified, that are dependent on different strategies of dealing with what complexity means. Maguire et al. (Ibid., p. 171) suggest that complexity has quite a long history of being used to characterize organizations and their environments. For instance, the 
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American political scientist and sociologist Herbert Simon in 1962 characterized a complex system as a system with ‘many parts interacting richly and interdependently, so as to make knowledge and predictions of system-level behavior difficult to derive from knowledge about the behavior of parts’ (Ibid.). Yet, modern attempts to “import” themes from complexity theory into the study of organizations have been made from roughly the middle of the nineteen eighties onwards. Maguire et al. write that the emergence of literature on different aspects of “general complexity theory” ‘more or less parallels the movement of key ideas into the organizational literature.’ (Ibid., p. 172) For instance, publications on themes such as self-organization in systems, dissipative structures and the constructive role of disorder emerged first, followed later by publications on complexity theory proper. (Ibid.)  In their review of the available literature on complexity and organizations, Maguire 
et al. (2006, p. 165) differentiate between two approaches in “organizational complexity literature”:  1. Objectivists try to handle complexity through a strategy of reducing complexity, favoring models 2. Interpretivists are defined as complexity-absorbers, through strategies of exploring meaning and advocating metaphoric treatments.  They note that objectivist interpretations tend towards a philosophy of science rooted in positivism. They adopt an ontology and epistemology ‘premised on the existence and accessibility of objective information about a given system’ (Ibid., p. 174). Within this approach, representation is commonly considered to be an apolitical and neutral act. (Ibid.) By contrast, interpretivist approaches tends towards postmodernism and post-structuralism. They adopt an ontology and epistemology ‘premised on the impossibility of identifying any information as objective’. (Ibid.) They tend to view organizations and their members as interpretive, sense-making systems. According to Maguire et al., much of complexity science’s contribution to organizational studies consists of a metaphorical treatment of complexity science concepts. According to them, the danger of this is that situations may occur where metaphors are used, but are not acknowledged as such. Furthermore, they distinguish between works that is reflexive (and hence, sensitive to epistemological issues), and work that is not. They warn against the second kind of work, suggesting it is ‘faddish and prone to unsupportable claims’. In fact, in a different volume, Maguire and McKelvey (1999) perform an extensive review of applications of complexity 
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theory to organization studies, aiming ‘to give readers a broad overview of the general quality of complexity applications to CEO problems and to test how vulnerable to faddism they are’ (Maguire & McKelvey, 1999, p. 19). Maguire et al. propose the following model for giving an overview of the field:
 Figure 1: A map of the field of complexity science and organization studies  (Maguire et al., 2006, p. 174)  As the model shows, Maguire et al. (2006, p. 174) note that much of the literature on complexity and organizations is introductory in nature, introducing complexity and related sciences to organization scholars and managers and suggesting possible implications for their field of study. There is less literature that draws on complexity science in order to investigate and explain specific organizational phenomena (Ibid.). However, they also mention that this is to be expected, given the emerging nature of the field. The body of phenomena-driven work that does exist can be further differentiated into work based on models, metaphors or meaning. Work based in models consists mostly of computational experiments done with agent-based models. This approach aims to simulate organizational phenomena and predict behavior in the real world based on these simulations, although there is also some qualitative work that focuses on gathering the data used to build these models.  The interpretivist strand of phenomena-driven work, by contrast, focuses on the use and applicability of terms from the complexity sciences as metaphors, using these both in an attempt to better understand organizational behavior from a theoretical viewpoint, and to generate more insight into issues of organization for those that are involved in 
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them. Here, methods such as storytelling are often used. I should mention that Maguire et 
al., despite what their model seems to suggest, do not differentiate between meanings and metaphors in a meaningful way. This may not be surprising, because it can be argued that they are inextricably interlinked, since creating and sharing meaning (interpretation) is often dependent on the use of metaphors. Using concepts from complexity theory in a metaphorical way can be a strategy to engage with the processes of meaning making of individuals involved in organizations. Brown (2004, p. 15-16) suggests that aspects of complex adaptive systems theory may be useful as a “generative metaphor” in organizations, enriching the understanding of the organizational behavior of the people working within it. I would like to explore one of the issues raised by Maguire et al. in more detail: the warning against faddism when it comes to applying complexity theory to organizations. This is important because it raises the question of whether the attempt to “bring in” complexity theory in organization studies is at all a valid undertaking. In a volume of essays on the “interaction of complexity and management” edited by Michel Lissack, the topic of faddism in management is explored in several articles. Goldstein (2002, p. 254) writes that all researchers and practitioners in the field know that organizational studies ‘are a prime target for fads’. He suggest that this is due to the fact that the field of organization studies had to “borrow” and at the same time differentiate itself from related fields such as sociology, psychology, finance and economics. Since a competitive advantage in business is often gained by novelty and the claim of specific benefits in a certain domain, this has been extended to the more formal sphere of organizational research as well. Hence, organizational studies are ‘barraged by a seemingly never-ending stream of novel methods and constructs promising tremendous benefits’ (Ibid.). In time, most of these turn out to be ‘mere gimmicks’, rather than meaningful contributions to the field. However, Goldstein suggests that complexity is different, since it is a form of fundamental inquiry into the foundations of the functioning of systems, rooted in mathematics and thus capable of crossing across distinct scientific fields. (Ibid.). He further suggests that complexity theory and organizational studies may even be “co-evolutionary”, since from the beginning organizational theory and complexity theory have influenced each other. Furthermore, human organizations form a very interesting field of research for complexity theory, because they are equipped with many already existing metrics, which can generate useful data. (Ibid., p. 261). In the same volume, Abrahamson also states that given the theories that have been formed on fads and how they function, complexity theory is probably not a fad, since it does not contain an easily doable problem or type of study that can be done on 
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already available data. If it were to take the form of a ‘complexity theory tool’, that can be packaged and sold and is claimed to be universally useful, then it will be a fad (2002, p. 250). Given these remarks and the distinction made by Maguire et al., I would conclude that bringing complexity theory into organization studies does not need to be, in principle, a faddish undertaking. However, the ways in which bringing complexity theory into the discourse of organization studies are approached should be critically evaluated, to ensure that they do not fall victim to the faddism Goldstein describes. I will do this in the following paragraph. Concluding their treatment of complexity theory within the field of organization studies, they suggest two areas of research where applying complexity theory to organizations may be particularly fruitful.  1.  Processes of emergence and the creation of order. While in the classical view, order in organization is created from the top down by decisions made by managers, order may instead be approached as a process in which both bottom-up and top-down hierarchies become ‘entangled’ (Ibid., p. 198). Questions that may be asked in such research include how and to what extent emergence co-exists with planned design, and what order or structures emerge through the interaction of organizational ‘agents’ in situations where managerial designs are less influential or absent.  2. Developing agent-based-models (ABMs). Researchers at the Santa Fe Institute, which is the main research institution dedicated to complexity theory, make much use of agent based models. These models show how in natural and social systems, intelligent behavior is generated from the local interaction of agents, following simple rules. This should be developed further with regards to the study of organizations.  
2.2: Complexity in studying organizations: objective or metaphorical? 
 It seems to me that Maguire et al. provide a good “map” of the current field of complexity theory applied to organizations and show an awareness of the epistemological and ontological questions associated with it. This is why I have closely followed their thinking in the previous section. Still, I would like to discuss some of the criticisms that have been levied at their way of thinking about complexity. One of the questions Maguire et al. raise is whether complexity in organizations should be considered to be an objective phenomenon (e.g. as an ontological property of 
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organizations) or not. Although they do recognize that what they define as objective and interpretivist approaches may both be valid, depending on how they are used, I would argue that they display a bias toward the objectivist model. For example, they warn only about the dangers of a metaphorical treatment of concepts from complexity theory, noting that these approaches are often less sensitive to epistemological issues.  I would argue that there are dangers resulting from objectivist approaches too, which Maguire et al. do not recognize as such. The first is the fact that complexity theory, as I have argued in the previous chapter, presents a challenge to the assumptions underlying classical, positivist science itself. For example, pointing to the impossibility of explaining the behavior of complex systems through linear or ‘simple’ principles of causality. Obviously this should be taken into account when using complexity theory to better understand organizations. It seems to me that objectivist approaches to bringing complexity into organization studies, given their underlying assumptions derived from positivist science (cf. Maguire et al., p. 165), and their apparent claim of providing objectivity, are perhaps more liable to showing a lack of sensitivity about epistemological issues than interpretivist approaches. The second relates to the main approach Maguire et al. identify as objectivist, the development of agent-based models. While they suggest that developing agent-based-models is a fruitful approach to applying complexity theory to organizations, they also write that more attention should be paid to the degree to which elements of these models represent phenomena in the real world, especially when trying to model social systems. (Ibid., p. 199). Although emergence occurs in ABM’s (for example, with agents following simple, local rules showing that novel, more complex behavior develops on the level of the whole), little attention is often paid to the question of why it occurs here instead of there, and how it is affected by changes in the capabilities of agents and by organizational contingencies (e.g. tasks, network configuration, information flows, technology) (Ibid.).  Furthermore, it is still an open question whether it is possible to create a model in which the behavior of agents is able to mimic the complexity of human behavior, and hence, approach real-life conditions. Stocker et al. (1996, cited in Brown 2004, p.29) argue that to model agents within a complex system accurately, they must have evolutionary capabilities, for example knowledge of internal parameters and of the agent’s environment. While some agents in these models have shown evidence of learning behavior, they are still far away from the complexity real-life agents within social systems (which is to say, humans) exhibit. If we view the behavior of humans as a complex system in itself (since, for example, the brain and our personalities exhibit many or all of the 
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properties proposed by Cilliers) it should follow that for a model to approach the possibilities of human interaction, agents should have no less complexity than humans themselves. Maguire et al. themselves note that the sophistication of agents needs to be much higher in models used in social science than in the natural sciences, writing that ‘most models are not as well validated against real-world phenomena as they should be.’ (Ibid., p. 200).  The publications I have reviewed in the field of ABM’s and complexity in organizations seem to support this notion. For example, North and Macal’s book Managing 
Business Complexity: Discovering Strategic Solutions with Agent-Based Modeling and 
Simulation (2007), which is used in a 2014 workshop by the Santa Fe Institute giving an introduction to agent-based modeling in business. Since the Santa Fe Institute is the foremost institution studying complexity theory worldwide, I would argue that it can be considered a relevant example of using ABM’s for studying complexity in organizations. North and Macal devote chapter 6 of their book to designing agents for ABM’s of social systems. In this chapter, they write that effective agents in social ABM’s are to be based on one or more social science theories that explain broad subsets of social behavior (i.e. friendship, war, family, governance). They then describe how rational choice theory can be used as an example of this approach (North & Macal, 2007, p. 97). But in a curious move, they go on to explain that in the real world, rational choice theory applies to almost no social agent whatsoever  (Ibid., p. 98). This is consistent with recent findings, as modern research in psychology, ethology8 and economics has shown that humans rarely act as “rational maximizers”, often exhibiting “non-rational” behavior. North and Macal follow this by discussing a process by which the properties agents need to exhibit in a specific model can be selected, called “knowledge engineering”. They then provide an example of a model that can be used to predict buying behavior in a shopping mall. This concludes the chapter.  The important epistemological and ontological problems inherent in trying to model the complexity of a real-life social agent in social ABM’s, such as those I have described above, are dismissed cursorily and not discussed anywhere else in the book. To me this seems to indicate precisely the lack of reflexivity which Maguire et al. assert indicates that an approach is prone to faddism. The fact that the example North and Macal provide to show how their approach to modeling social agents works is Rational Choice 
8 De Waal’s recent research on empathy in animals, for instance, shows that both primates and other animals show empathy as well as rational self-interest, even in cases where it offers them no immediate or deferred gains. E.g. http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/the_evolution_of_empathy 
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Theory also does not bode well, since this is a theory which has been shown to be invalid when it comes to predicting most of human behavior in the real world. The agents North and Macal propose to develop through “knowledge engineering” are not complex themselves, even when they are built on sound underlying social theories. Taking into account Doolittle’s (1999, cited in Brown 2004, p. 24) assertion that what emerges as characteristics of a particular complex system often forms the individual agents within a complex system at a higher level, this means that the complexity of the overarching system is reduced, and hence, lost.  Unless the agents in such models are capable of displaying the kind of properties Stocker et al. (1996, cited in Brown 2004, p.29) describe, such as knowledge of internal parameters and of the agent’s environment.    Given that, despite these shortcomings, the model of North and Macal is presented as an unproblematic and promising approach, it seems to me that agent-based modeling as a way of using complexity theory improve our understanding of organizations is still in its infancy.  Given these facts, I tend to disagree with Maguire et al. that developing ABM’s is a potentially fruitful way to further a complex understanding of organizations. Nonetheless, I do think that ABM’s have usefulness. For example ABM’s have been used to provide a proof-of-concept of how complex behavior can emerge on a higher level in models with agents following simple, local rules, without an overarching teleology, thus confirming the validity of concepts from complexity theory. They may also be useful in cases in which complexity is limited, for example, in making predictions about how changes in the interior of a shop will influence consumer behavior. 
 
2.3: Epistemological problems bringing complexity theory to organizations   There is also an overarching issue which is highlighted by Maguire et al.’s views of complexity as they relates to organizations. Van Uden (2004, p. 51) writes that in a different publication, Maguire and McKelvey (1999) are troubled by what they take to be lax approaches to bringing complexity theory into organization studies. They claim that unless aspects from complexity science can be applied to organizations in a more than metaphorical sense, they do not constitute a serious science and are on their way to short-lived faddism (Maguire & McKelvey, 1999, p. 57). Van Uden (2004, p. 51) argues that the reason why Maguire and McKelvey regard the relationship between organizations and complexity as not just metaphorical, is that they take organizations to be a particular sub-category of complex systems. And if organizations are taken to be complex systems by definition, it follows that ‘a theory of complex systems simply is a theory of organizations.’ 
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(Ibid.). Van Uden describes Maguire and McKelvey as part of the “complexity school” that argues that when it comes to complex systems, the differences systems are minimal. Whether it comes to brains, snowflakes or organizations, the same general principles apply. This is dependent on the assumption that different phenomena ‘work in the same sort of way because they are the same sort of system’ (Byrne, 1998, p. 53 in Van Uden, 2004, p. 51).  According to Van Uden, complexity theory proposes that a shared property, a “complex systemness”, exists that applies to many phenomena. If such property can be abstracted from the local phenomena that are being studied, it could be used to identify and define aspects shared by all complex systems. This would then form a kind of “meta-knowledge” that can be used to, for example, predict the behavior of a phenomenon once it has been identified as complex. Van Uden calls this idea the “Grand Complexity Project” (Ibid.)  Van Uden links this axiom to the age-old search for finding a “lingua franca” of science that will transcend the borders between scientific disciplines and allows working towards a “theory of everything”. He illustrates this with several historical parallels, such as the attempts by Auguste Comte to find the “laws of social dynamics” and the emergence of cybernetics as a proposed “meta-science” shortly after the second World War (Ibid., p. 52-53). In cybernetics, the basic assumption was that both machines and living individuals are essentially processors of information (Ibid., p. 53), suggesting that common principles underlying their functioning can be found. Van Uden points to three historical parallels between cybernetics and complexity theory: ‘ 1. The research programmes [sic] of both complexity theory and cybernetics are founded on the assumption that the phenomena under study can safely be stripped of their earthly forms and discussed on a more fundamental, more abstract level. 2. On both occasions it is believed that a ‘higher level knowledge’ can be shared among researchers from all sorts of disciplines 3. The language of the ‘hard’, natural sciences is favoured over that of the social sciences.’  (Ibid., p. 53)  The project of cybernetics was eventually mostly abandoned, since trying to integrate knowledge from diverse existing disciplines into a tightly defined overarching 
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new framework proved to be an impossible effort. Van Uden seems to suggest that complexity theory could develop in the same way, if it is dependent on the strategies outlined above. It can be said that both some of the theories I have referred to in chapter one and many of the assumptions made by Maguire et al. reflect the idea of a grand complexity project. For example, both Maguire & McKelvey (1999, p. 24) and Goldstein (2002 p. 254-261) suggest that studying complexity in organizations will likely yield knowledge and insights that can be incorporated into the overarching field of complexity theory proper. But as Van Uden (2004, p. 54) writes, this would require that specific knowledge about the particular instance of complex systems called organizations can be stripped of its “organizationness”, to be offered to the wider community of complexity researchers. Under the assumptions of the “Grand Complexity Project”, this can be accomplished by focusing on the deeper “complex systemness” of a particular system. This “complex systemness” then ideally needs to be locatable using mathematical and computational tools that fall within the objectivist approach, such as the agent-based models proposed by Maguire et al. and North and Macal. Van Uden cites Byrne (1998, p. 55 in Van Uden, 2004, p. 54) who contends that complexity science can only deal with ‘mathematically formalized accounts of reality’. Indeed, if the object of complexity science is to create a uniform, overarching scientific framework to describe and predict the behavior of many different systems, there is a need for using such a language in order to be able to abstract from site-specific phenomena and render operations of induction and deduction possible. But this runs the risk of applying precisely the reductionist strategies to which complexity theory runs counter (cf. Morin, 2006 and 2008; Cilliers, 1998 and 2008). Since knowledge about the behavior of a specific complex system is dependent on the interactions within that system, abstracting from such knowledge to “general knowledge” about complex systems may mean again losing the complexity we are trying to research. Van Uden (2004, p. 56) is highly critical of Maguire & McKelvey (1999, p. 56), since they suggest that once complexity scientists have reached a consensus on how to synthesize and integrate the ideas and concepts they bring together from diverse disciplines, it will be possible for organization researchers to really start bringing complexity theory into their discipline, instead of relying on an ill-founded metaphorical treatment. However, there seems to be little reason to suspect that such a consensus will ever happen in complexity theory, let alone that it is possible. As in any field of research, there is a diversity of differing approaches and ideas, even about the fundamental issues and assumptions in the field. (Van Uden, 2004, p. 56).  
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It seems to me that the notion of the “Grand Complexity Project” yields some important insights for the question I try to answer in this thesis. According to Van Uden, thinking from the idea of the “Grand Complexity Project” introduces two problems. The first is the fact that once complexity theory is introduced in the study of organization based on these principles, it runs the risk of reaffirming exactly those fallacies associated with  reductionist thinking complexity theorists seek to avoid. Namely, that a specific complex system can be analyzed through reductionist methods, generating disembedded, overarching knowledge that applies to all complex systems. The second problem has to do with the general question of whether concepts and methods can be imported or “translated” from one area of science into another. More specifically, from other fields of study to the study of organization. I will discuss this in some more detail here. As Van Uden (2004, p. 64) writes, Maguire and McKelvey (1999) claim that ideas in the study of management and organization that are not rooted in firm research are eventually revealed as fads, writing ‘the record is clear over the past several decades – management ideas that do not become legitimized by resting on a foundation of quality research are quickly replaced by the next fad coming down the pike’ (Ibid., p. 19). However, Van Uden (2004, p. 65) believes that the opposite is true. For example, many concepts in the field of organization studies have been derived from the field of warfare studies. Concepts such as the need for “strategies” and “tactics”, having “divisions” and “lines of command” within an organization, or “conquering” and “defending” a market are clearly imported from its discourse. Nonetheless, these ideas were not borrowed from a unified view or theory. Nor does single consensus exist within warfare studies on how these ideas and concepts fit together (Ibid., p. 65). Yet they have been very successful within organization studies, both in developing a better understanding of organizational behavior and in developing guidelines for successful management strategies. I believe this is an important example, because it answers the question of whether advocating a metaphorical treatment of concepts derived from other disciplines within the field of organization studies is valid or not. Maguire and McKelvey seem to insist that bringing ideas in from other sciences needs to be done in a very thorough way, keeping internal consistency and meaning intact and providing ‘rigorous definition and operationalization’ (Maguire & McKelvey, 1999, p. 23-5), or not at all. If not, they run the risk of becoming meaningless. Van Uden takes a different view, citing Morgan who, in his influential book 
Images of Organization, argues that theories of organization` should be seen as different lenses, which can be used to disclose more or different aspects of an organization. He describes these lenses as ‘a basic structural form of experience through which human 
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beings engage, organize, and understand their world’ (Morgan, 1983 in Maas, 1988 p.26). Hence, their usefulness doesn’t depend so much on a correct definition or operationalization, but on the processes of meaning making they are able to elicit.  An example of this is the concept of “organizational culture”. Introduced by Edgar Schein in 1985, it was, at the time, a metaphor which was alien to the discourse in the study of organizations , 2004, p. 68). Whereas today, asking someone about the culture of their organization is equally valid as asking about its structure (Ibid.). According to Van Uden, applying the concept of culture to organizations (and ‘sub-concepts such as heroes, sagas, rituals, artifacts, norms, dominant values etc.’) was not dependent on providing a universal definition and rigorous operationalizations. Rather, it turned out to be a useful concept for generating new insights, informing existing topics of research such as leadership (Ibid., p. 69), and generating new ones. Hence, for Schein, culture was a “conceptual tool” with a descriptive intent, not the end result of a rigorous, empirically validated research program (Ibid.). In fact, over time, the meaning of the concept of culture in organization studies began to shift from the meaning attributed to it in the fields it was originally derived from, such as cultural anthropology. From a concept with a purely descriptive intent (culture as a “naturally arising” feature of organizations), it began to acquire a prescriptive content as well. Organization culture came to be seen as something that could and should be managed in order for organizations to become effective (Ibid., p. 70).  As Van Uden (Ibid.) puts it, concepts “imported” in such a way will acquire multiple interpretations over time, spawn novel ideas and approaches in management, and become increasingly independent of their “root meaning” in a different discipline. What this illustrates is that while a concept that imported into a different discourse may originally function as a “generative metaphor”, it can eventually acquire a new “grounding” within that discourse that is no longer dependent on its original meaning. Furthermore, even within one area of study concepts hardly have an unequivocal meaning. The concept of culture is particularly illustrative of this, because not only is it defined very differently between disciplines (e.g. sociology, psychology, anthropology, the arts), it is now so firmly rooted in organization studies that one would be hard pressed to find one theorist insisting it does not have a meaning firmly grounded in the real world of organizations. Given Van Uden’s examples there does not seem to be a compelling reason to reject a metaphorical treatment of concepts brought into organization studies from other sciences, such as complexity science, off-hand.  Following Morgan’s argument, even if they are used purely as metaphors, these concepts and ideas can function as a lens that allows us to develop new insight in how organizations work. Furthermore, even when ideas 
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brought into organization studies originally lack a strong empirical grounding of rigorous definitions, the history of the field shows that if they have potential, they tend to acquire a firmer footing eventually. I conclude, therefore, that trying to prove that complexity is an objectively occurring property of the social system that is an organization is ultimately not necessary for complexity theory to be used in organization studies. And also, that when it comes to using complexity science in organization studies, the fact that there is at the moment no unified theory of complexity, nor a universally shared definition of what complexity is that transcends disciplines, is not necessarily problematic. More so when we consider that  a. Since complexity science is still in many ways a nascent field, its theories are in a less thought-out stage than comparatively older sciences. A dialogue with existing disciplines is necessary for them to develop further.  b. Though we may be able to develop a common framework (‘generalized theory of complexity’), it is to be expected that bringing complexity science into existing disciplines will create sub-branches with their own ideas and methods, much like there are differences between complexity theory as it is used in the fields from which it originated, such as biology and physics. And developing such a unified framework may not be necessary when we consider that bringing knowledge derived from complexity theory within a different framework can be fruitful even in the absence of an overarching theory. c. Since, as many have argued (cf. Cilliers and Morin in chapter 1), complexity science challenges our existing scientific paradigms, trying to develop it by way of principles dominant in classical science, such as reductionism and looking for general laws, may be problematic in and of itself. Perhaps we need to develop a “complex understanding” of complexity.     Having given a short overview of  how concepts from complexity science have been brought to organization studies so far and having explored some of the epistemological questions this raises, I will go into more detail  about what a complexity-based understanding of organizations may entail in the next section. I will discuss the theories of Ralph Stacey. I consider him to be highly relevant for the central question of this thesis, because he describes in detail how confronting complexity theory with organization studies posits a challenge to existing theories of organization and the underlying assumptions they share. Furthermore, he attempts to develop his own theory 
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of organization based on taking serious the challenge complexity theory poses. In this, he also explores the first topic suggested by Maguire et al. (2006) as fruitful for further research: the creation of order in organization and the interplay of emergence and planned design.   
2.4: Stacey: how complexity science can inform and challenge organization studies  Ralph Stacey first published about the topic of complexity and organizations in 1991, making him one of the first authors to make a substantial effort to write about the challenge complexity theory poses to existing ways of thinking about organizations. In his comprehensive book Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics: the challenge of 
complexity, he provides an approach towards developing an understanding of organizations that is grounded in complexity theory. His approach is threefold. He begins by giving a broad overview of the field of organization studies, focusing on those theories of organization that have been very influential during the second half of the 20th century, such as general and open systems thinking and theories based on organizational learning and knowledge creation. He then discusses how they share certain underlying assumptions, which are put into question by the insights complexity theory provides. After introducing complexity theory proper, Stacey explains some of the existing approaches towards creating a science of organization studies rooted in complexity theory. But he contends they share most of the underlying assumptions of earlier theories which he criticizes. This leads him to provide his own approach to complexity theory and organizations called “Complex Responsive Processes”. I will begin by giving an outline of Stacey’s criticism of existing organization theory. Stacey writes that in organizations, phenomena are often explained by proposing a linear relationship between cause and effect. For instance, if an organization is successful, this success is often attributed to a specific style of management, culture or control system. It is then proposed that if this culture, style or system is applied more, the organization will also be more successful. But causality in social systems is often nonlinear, mutual and circular. For example, while the demand for a product which an organization produces may be dependent on the wishes of a customer, the wishes the customer has are also influenced by the choices the organization makes about the product, which then further steers the organization into a certain direction (Stacey, 2007, p. 13). An example of this is the introduction of the app store by Apple. In 2008, a year after its introduction, the iPhone was the first smartphone to receive an “app store”, where 
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games and other software could be bought and downloaded for the device. As a consequence, many software developers started building and selling software for this online store, such as games. As many users of the iPhone started playing these games, more games started being produced. This in turn increased sales of the product and caused other manufacturers of smartphones to develop their own app stores as well. As consumers began expecting smartphones to have good graphics performance and a selection of games available for their platform, manufacturers started designing their products accordingly. Which in turn lead to a growing market with more games being produced. As of 2013, the market for mobile games was estimated to be worth 12,2 billion, and is expected by some to grow to 60 billion in 2017, accounting for 60% of the total market for computer games. Mobile gaming is now considered an important market, whereas before 2008 it was virtually nonexistent. In this example, the choice made by Apple influenced the behavior of its customers, while this in turn influenced the behavior of Apple, other smartphone manufacturers, and secondary industries such as chipmakers (compelling them to design mobile graphics chips that offer good performance in games). These effects came together to generate a thriving new industry.  Stacey identifies five assumptions that are, in his view, common to all perspectives on organizations that are part of the dominant discourse, which he describes as ‘that way of talking and writing about organisations [sic] that is immediately recognizable to organizational practitioners, educators and researchers. It sets the most acceptable terms within which debates about, and funded research into organisations [sic] and their management can be conducted. As such, it reflects particular, fundamental, taken-for-granted assumptions about organizational worlds that constitute “common sense” ways of thinking.’ (Ibid., p. 179). These are:  ‘ 1. Organizations are, or are to be thought of ‘as if’ they were, systems. That is to say, they are to be understood as entities that exist outside of human interaction. 2. These systems are external to the individuals forming them. This means it is possible for an individual to take a position external to the system, and from this, make objective observations of what is happening. 3. It is the autonomous individual which is primary, because in the cognitivist, constructivist, humanistic and psychoanalytic psychological theories underlying the discourse, the individual is the “primary unit of concern.” 
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4. The organization and the social are thought of a systems being constructed by the actions of individuals, with those constructions then acting back on those individuals as a cause of their behavior. 5. Since they are external to and constructors of the organizational system, individuals can plan, design, or at the very least influence the movement of the system.’ (Stacey, 2007 p. 4, 21, 180-181)  While the way of thinking which reflects these assumptions was developed with regards to the private sector of Western economies, it has increasingly been applied to the public sector as well, through processes of marketization and managerialism (Ibid., p. 181). This means that they can be considered to be dominant across all organizations. Stacey writes that these assumptions can all be associated with the “first wave of systems thinking”, which developed from the nineteen fifties onwards. Common to all of them is that they reify organizations, which is to say they treat organizations as if they are real objects, existing in the world outside of the observer (Ibid., p. 22). The absurdity of this can be illustrated by comparing organizations to humans. While ideas may differ on what constitutes a human9, the category “human” can in principle be situated in an externally existing object, such as the body. To be human is to have, or to be a body. An organization is not identifiable in the outside world in such a simple way. After all, what does an organization make? Is it the buildings which are associated with it? The people working for the organization? Their patterns of interaction? The electronic or physical artefacts they produce? No simple and/or ultimate answer is possible here. Nonetheless, we commonly treat organizations as if they were real things. As for the assumptions noted above, Stacey writes that especially the fifth assumption ‘reflects an implicit and powerful ideology to do with managerial control’ (Ibid. p. 21). In order to define an organizational system as something that is subject to managerial control, both the system and the individuals forming them need to be constructed as external to it. This criticism is one of the main threads that run throughout the book, and Stacey contends that it is supported by complexity theory. To discuss the challenge complexity theory poses to existing organization theories, Stacey describes three dominant strands of thinking about organization and management 
9 For instance, consider whether a person who is brain dead, and thus only has a body but no longer a mind, still constitutes a human. This becomes problematic when we also consider how to explain what differentiates humans from animals. 
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that have been part of the first wave of systems thinking, describing their central tenets and the theoretical fields from which these have been are derived.   1. Strategic choice theory: what an organization becomes is decided by the strategies chosen by its dominant coalition in a rational manner. Managers need to analyze past results and forecast the future, and use this information to make plans to achieve certain goals. They then decide on aims and objectives the whole organization should follow, in order to achieve these goals.   This strand is built on theoretical foundations of cybernetics and cognitivist psychology. Influential theories in this field are those of Igor Ansoff, Michael Porter, and Gary Hamel/C.K. Prahalad. Well known concepts/models in this field include SWOT-analysis and value chain analysis (Ibid., p. 56)  2. Learning organizations: here, what an organization becomes is decided by the learning processes in which its managers and other members engage. This strand evolved in part from a criticism of strategic choice theory, pointing to the limits of predictability and the complicated processes that are involved in creating strategies in organizations. This is why, in these theories, phenomena such as leadership, inspiration and motivation are important to the functioning of an organization. There is a focus on how individuals give meaning to their experiences. Managers cannot have perfect control, but should look for leverage points where control of the “mental models” occurring in the organization can be exerted.   This strand is based on theoretical underpinnings of systems dynamics, humanistic psychology and constructivist psychology. Influential theorists within this field include Chris Argyris, Edgar Schein, Karl Weick, Peter Senge and Otto Scharmer. Methods used are often special kinds of dialogue, which Stacey – somewhat pejoratively –  calls mystical. (Ibid., p. 106)  
3. General systems theory combined with psychoanalytic perspectives: here, what an organization becomes is decided by strategic choice and learning, intertwined with complex unconscious processes. There is a focus on anxiety as a psychosocial motivator and the way it is contained. This strand arose in part 
43 
 
through a criticism of both strategic choice theory and learning organization, pointing to the unacknowledged role unconscious (group) processes play in organizational behavior. For instance, in an environment high in anxiety (for example, because the existence of an organization is being threatened), it is assumed that humans will look for a type of charismatic leadership, in order to create a “holding environment” that will soothe them. This can create a “culture of dependence” where passivity becomes the norm. There is also a focus on how groups tend to produce in-group behavior and “neurotic forms of leadership”. Theorists in this field include Manfred Kets de Vries and Tom Peters/Robert Waterman. (Ibid., p. 127)  According to Stacey, it is common to first-order systems thinking, and hence, to the theories of organization presented above, to assume that reality that can be objectively observed by an individual. Organization are thought of as consisting of systems having a purpose, which can be observed and modeled objectively. Because of this, organizations can be imagined as systems that can be controlled by managers in an optimal manner (Ibid., p. 132). First-order systems thinking concerns itself with intervening in the system in order to define goals, identify problems and propose rational solutions. (Ibid.) This is dependent on a process of reducing a situation to identifiable objects with well-defined properties. Finding the general rules that apply to them, applying these rules in a logical way, and then drawing conclusions about what should be done.  However, in the last decades of the twentieth century, these aspects of first-order systems thinking have increasingly become challenged. One such challenge is that in first-order systems thinking individuals are represented as functioning in a rational, deterministic way. Other aspects of life which are also highly determining for human functioning, such as emotions, conflict, politics, culture and ethics, are ignored (Ibid., p. 131). A second criticism is that they are trapped in the fallacy of reification: organizations are presented as physical entities with clear boundaries, structures and functions, which they clearly are not. Furthermore, as Stacey notes, in the real world, situations rarely lend themselves to identifying systems with clearly defined goals and objectives (Ibid.). The third and perhaps main criticism is that one cannot technically become an outside observer of one’s own system. This resulted in the emergence of second-order systems thinking. Within second-order systems thinking, Stacey identifies approaches such as Interactive Planning, Soft Systems Methodology, Critical Systems Thinking, and Autopoiesis. While first order systems thinking focuses on the dynamic interaction 
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between parts of a system and between systems in an environment, it still posits a hard separation between the observer and the observed.  According to Stacey, this leads to a “dual causality”. The problem is that as soon as a system has been specified by an observer, it can only unfold that which the observer has specified or enfolded in it (Ibid., p. 146). In other words, it becomes subject to formative causality. Therefore, the source of transformative change must always be the functioning of the observer.  Second-order systems thinking seeks to solve this by incorporating the observer within the system. Theorists of second-order systems thinking argue that the reification (that is to say, the positing of a system as external to the observer) that lies at the heart of the first wave of systems thinking is invalid.  Thus within second-order systems thinking, there is a focus on reflecting on how humans are always determined by their own framework of understanding. It becomes necessary to pay attention to the mental models or representations that are created and used to “make sense” by actors that are part of a system. This requires that we reflect on the functioning of our knowing and perceiving with regards to a system (Ibid., p. 132). While Stacey is sympathetic to the way in which this approach attempts to solve the issues present in first-order systems thinking, he contends it produces a fundamental problem. When subjects change their mental models through experience, this change is dependent on a higher-order system that includes the process of changing mental models itself. But what then causes this process? According to Stacey, this question leads to a problem of “infinite regress” (Ibid., p. 146). If the subject is a part of the system, this means it can no longer be explained why a system transforms, because the transformer (the observer) is a part of the system itself, and hence, subject to the same formative causality. According to Stacey, the only way solve this problem within second-order systems thinking is to ‘appeal to a kind of mystical whole’ (Ibid., p. 133). Stacey suggests this issue results from a conceptual problem, which is caused by the fact that systems thinking depends on a spatial metaphor (Ibid., p. 134). According to Stacey, systems thinking always involves postulating a “whole” which is separated from other wholes by a boundary. This means that an inside and an outside is created. This inside and outside have to be different from one another. Hence, a dualism is posited in which different causalities apply to the inside and the outside (Ibid.). This means that according to Stacey, complexity theory posits a challenge to the central idea of systems thinking itself. According to Stacey, the often implicit assumptions underpinning the dominant discourse I have outlined above, have at their center a belief in the possibility and necessity of control (Ibid., p. 181). This means it justifies, for example, the use of science 
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for the exploitation of natural resources, but also the concern organizations have with creating efficiency, even in those cases where those within organization experience this as a form of oppression. (Ibid.)  While Stacey notes that these aspects have not gone uncontested, he asserts that the responses to them are dependent on a paradigm of control too. For example, ecological movements call for the control of the exploitation of natural resources by the private sector. What goes unquestioned, however, is whether we humans are, in fact, able to be in control (Ibid., p. 182). As I have noted in the introduction to this thesis, this question is perhaps the most dangerous and controversial when it comes to organizations, because it questions the possibility of organization itself and connects it to our deeply felt desire for imposing order on the inherent chaos and unpredictability of the world. Because it is through organizations and organizing we generate the soothing fiction that we are in control of life and the future. It seems to me that this is intimately related to humanistic studies’ commitment to humanizing organizations, both as a challenge to the violence and power asymmetries occurring in organizations, and as a challenge to the assumptions of the discourse of humanism itself. In the words of Stacey: ‘To question the ideology of control is not simply to question domination and oppression but also to question the nature of our ability to preserve and improve the world we live in. It is to question some of the deepest beliefs people have about what it is possible for them to do for the good’ (Ibid.) Hence, Stacey notes that the development of the complexity sciences, when connected to the reality of human action and in human organizations, can be experienced as deeply threatening (Ibid.) In different words, one might say that complexity poses a challenge to some of the central tenets of the enlightenment values underlying modernity, e.g. the possibility of man imposing a benign order (organization) on the world through reason.  Stacey considers four notions from complexity theory to be particularly challenging to organization theory, and indeed, organizational life. (Ibid., p. 183-184):  1. Most natural phenomena are characterized by the paradoxical dynamics of systems operating far-from-equilibrium, where they have a structure but it is also dissipating. This challenges the assumption that achieving stability and equilibrium in systems, such as organizations, can be equated with success. Rather, theories need to be developed from the understanding that instability is vital to organizational life. 2. The development of these systems is radically unpredictable over the long term. Their futures are unknowable because they evolve through the presence of 
46 
 
diversity (the local interactions that generate emergent behavior). This challenges the assumption that the movement of systems is predictable, or follows certain predefined models. If this “radical unpredictability” is to be taken seriously, the most basic prescriptions for managing organizations (such as planning and control) need to be re-thought. 3. Since the future of complex systems emerges from local interaction, there is no blueprint  or plan that guides the development of the whole system. This challenges the common notion in organization theory that it is possible to develop or change an organization from the outside towards a pre-defined goal, directly changing the “whole”. 4. If diversity is a precondition for development and evolution, this challenges the concept that a well-functioning organization is characterized by a harmony in which the pieces fit together, which is dependent on, for example, interventions such as creating shared mission/vision statements and “managing” organizational culture.   Given the shared assumptions Stacey identifies in most theories in organization studies, and the critical/transformative function he identifies in complexity theory, he assumes a critical position towards existing approaches to bringing complexity theory into organization studies. His assertion is that both natural scientists and organizational theorists working with complexity tend to remain within an orthodox perspective on science, because they continue to define the agents making up a complex system in cybernetic and cognitivist terms. They also continue thinking within the systems paradigm, always positing a whole with boundaries separating it from other wholes. This means they avoid exploring the consequences of radical unpredictability, reiterating a conventional notion of control (Ibid., p. 213).  For example, many theorists of complexity in organization use the notion of  “simple rules”, such as Steven Levy and Gareth Morgan. This proceeds from the idea that in the absence of centralized, top-down control, managers will still be able to influence organizational behavior for the best if they set a list of “simple rules” (analogous to the simple rules agents in ABM’s follow) for the individuals in the organization to follow. However, Stacey notes that this is dependent on disregarding the complexity inherent in human beings and their interaction. The emotional and embodied relating of individuals is a crucial part of their interaction, but it becomes lost within this model. Taking into account Stacey’s earlier comments, the manager who attempts to influence the system is 
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always an agent himself, not an external builder or programmer who can see objectively where the whole is going (Ibid., p. 214). For Stacey, the concept that “working with” complexity simply entails managers letting go of the notion of centralized control, but trying to re-establish control through different means, is invalid. It suggests that self-organization is something that can be consciously called upon when necessary, instead of something that is already inherent to how organizations function. (Ibid., p. 223)  Discussing the ideas of Raymond-Alain Thietart/Bernard Forgues, Irene Sanders, Shona Brown/Kathleen Eisenhardt, Margaret Wheatley, and Ikujiro Nonaka, Stacey notes a common tendency for theorists about organizational complexity to present emergence and self-organization as processes, structures or strategies that can be consciously employed by managers. (Ibid., p. 222-224 I concur with Stacey that in this regard, these theories suffer from a lack of reflexivity about the fundamental assumptions of organizational discourse and how these are challenged by complexity theory. Though some authors, such as Wheatley and Lewin/Regine, suggest that the “lessons of complexity” call for new forms of leadership, where leaders let go of their ego and align themselves with a “higher purpose” (cf. Stacey, p. 226-227), they still proceed from the assumption that these leaders somehow have a kind of special power that allows them to manipulate complex systems in a way ordinary humans can’t. Stacey notes this may even lead to instilling “cult values”, where the power asymmetries and conflicting aspects of human relating are covered up by positing an ideology where humans voluntarily submit themselves to a “greater living whole” (Ibid., p. 228). The idea, furthermore, that complex systems are somehow “greater wholes” external to the agents involved in them is a dangerous one, because it allows us to blame factors outside of our actions and interactions for what is happening. (Ibid., p. 228).  Concluding, Stacey is critical of existing approaches to using complexity theory in organization studies, because he contends they all approach organizations from a macro level and externally situated viewpoint, instead of focusing on the micro-interactions between agents that produce emergent behavior. (Ibid., p. 230) In other words, these systems follow a formative instead of an emergent causality. They posit the manager or consultant as an external observer, occupying a special position from which he can impose rules, alter parameters or create conditions, instead of recognizing that he is himself a part of the system. Stacey fears that the potentially radical implications of applying complexity science to organizations fades away as the fundamental assumptions of system theory and organizational discourse are reaffirmed. Hence, he interprets complexity in a way that is more radical and disruptive than what is proposed by Maguire et al. and other 
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organizational complexity theorists, focusing on its potential for generating emancipatory and transformative processes.  
2.5: Complex Responsive Processes 
 Because of the problems associated with existing approaches to using complexity theory in the study of organizations, Stacey tries to develop an alternative theory which he calls Complex Responsive Processes. He develops his ideas from the notion that humans as agents in complex systems differ from the agents studied in the natural complexity sciences in a fundamental way. As opposed to agents in natural systems, human agents are capable of perceiving and articulating part of the patterns on the level of the whole and trying to change these patterns in ways they desire, even within their local interaction. Stacey asserts that humans are fundamentally interdependent, as opposed to autonomous and independent (Ibid., p. 238). According to him, this is the base from which all organization emerges (Ibid., p. 450). Since individuals are formed by social interaction and form it at the same time, Stacey suggests doing away with the notion of a system, focusing instead on the responsive way in which persons interact with one another (Ibid., p. 239). If we consider processes, such as the development of an organization-wide strategy, to be an emergent result of the continual responsive interplay between interdependent persons, it becomes clear that no single individual can decide what their outcome will be. For example, although a leader or manager can articulate his desire for the “whole” to follow, the result of this intervention is dependent on many local interactions (Ibid.). The method for the individual to change organization processes, then, is to engage intentionally and skillfully in the processes of local interaction (Ibid.). These processes are strongly rooted in identities; since how people define themselves and their relationship to others determines what they seek to achieve (Ibid., p. 240).  Stacey relates this shift from complex system to complex process to the work of sociologist Norbert Elias, noting that Elias suggested that the development of a society is not caused by external “social forces”, but by the complex interweaving of actions and intentions of many different people (Ibid., p. 248).  Although this process is fundamentally unplanned, it does generate an emergent pattern of order, much like what has been suggested in complexity science. Stacey suggests that this view rooted in process transcends the idea of a duality between the individual and the social which is present in systems thinking, because the group and the individual are mutually formative and constitutive of one another (Ibid., p. 250).  
49 
 
According to Stacey, the key difference between his Complex Responsive Processes, as opposed to complex systems thinking as it has been used in organization studies so far, is that the patterns produced on the level of the “whole” are not external to the interaction, but constitute the interaction itself. (Ibid., p. 262). It does away with the spatial metaphor, associated with systems thinking, which posits an inside and an outside. People are not thought to participate in a system, which is a whole, but to be involved in simple interaction between each other in local situations (Ibid.). There is no objective observer’s position possible, because to be part of a complex responsive process is to be involved in it.    Because of this, Stacey calls attention to the importance of narrativity and narrative knowledge in organizations (Ibid., p. 375). Stacey notes that narrative knowledge consists of stories and evaluations of stories. Through these stories, people make sense of their shared experiences, dealing with their own subjectivity, group identity, ambiguities, and the use of imagination. In these narratives, there are “legitimate” and “shadow themes” (Ibid., 379), that is to say, stories which can be expressed as part of the current discourse, and stories which do not seem to merit a place there. Aspects such as ideology and power delineate between what is legitimate and what is not. Proceeding from the notion of narrativity, Stacey suggests that organizations be viewed as ‘generalised patterns of interaction between people, which are idealized as imaginative “wholes” which provide powerful experiences of “we” identity to members.’ (Ibid., p. 433). These patterns of interaction determine the population-wide patterns of organization. Within these interactions, power dynamics play a role, as do evaluations and ideology. The individual and collective aspects of persons’ identities arise within these interactions (Ibid., p. 434) Stacey is adamant that his theory of Complex Responsive Processes is based on a theory of transformative causality. That is to say, it avoids the problem of positing both a formative causality (where the behavior unfolding from a system is already enfolded in it) and a rationalist individual choice. Instead, human interaction is continually constructing the future (Ibid., p. 435). In this view, an organization can be seen as an evolving identity shared by its participants. (Ibid.) With regards to organizational practice, Stacey argues that complex responsive processes can be used as a framework for professionals working within organizations, using it as a model that allows one to “refocus attention” (Ibid., p. 442). He provides several guidelines for this:  
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1. Professionals should focus on aspects of organizations such as the quality of participation in self-organizing conversations, reflecting together on the quality of this participation. (Ibid., p. 445) 2. They should also pay attention to the quality of conversational life.  Not so much on creating the kinds of “special dialogues” favored by other perspectives, but by focusing on ordinary, everyday conversation and the themes that occur in them, identifying which themes are repetitive and may need to be acted upon. (Ibid., p. 445)  3. They should also focus on anxiety and where in the organization it arises. How can we live with the anxiety generated by change and uncertainty? (Ibid., p. 446) 4. They should focus on the quality of diversity in “their” organizations. This means paying attention to the “shadow conversations” and how these can block themes from entering into the organization’s experience of legitimate themes. (Ibid., p. 447) 5. They should focus on unpredictability and paradox. What does it mean to act without knowing everything, being full well aware of this, but acting even while the long term consequences of actions are unknowable. This requires letting go of the notion that if one is well informed and competent enough, long term predictability is a possibility, since that will inevitably result in a form of blame when it turns out not to be true.  (Ibid., p. 447)   Stacey  also notes that since the outcome of actions cannot be predicted in advance, the most important criteria for deciding what to do are moral and ethical in nature (Ibid., p. 448). Even though not knowing the outcome, the one who did the action will still be liable for it. Part of this, according to Stacey, is letting go of systems of control that have been shown not to work, such as long-term forecasting, acting from the local information available to the actor instead.  Having discussed Stacey’s theory in some detail, I would like to consider how his ideas relate to my sub-question “What could a theory of organization rooted in complexity look like?” In a general sense, I tend to agree with Stacey’s argument. It seems that much of the work that has been done on complexity and organization so far reiterates notions that should, from a complexity-informed view, no longer have a place in organization studies’ discourse. This includes the assumption that the complex systems called organizations, while displaying emergent self-organization because of the specific nature of their interactions, can still be implicitly conceptualized as rational, goal-oriented systems. And 
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the idea that complexity in organizations is something that can be “dealt with” by managers or other professionals through setting out overt or covert goals, targets, or “simple rules” which the organization will follow in order to achieve the desired results. Clearly, this is not true, since it would mean reaffirming those notions which complexity theory challenges. Although organizations as complex systems may exhibit goal-oriented behavior, the goals pursued cannot simply be set by the actors that are part of them in an unproblematic way. Nonetheless, it seems to me that one does not necessarily need complexity science to point to this. Many of the publications in organization studies over the last decades have focused on how organizations and the people within them rarely function in a rational and predictable way. It has been shown that professionals working in and with organizations often propagate a discourse in which organizations are said to function in this way, but act as if they don’t. I would suggest, therefore, that a manager, consultant or other professional in organizations who aims to do his work well may already intuitively be bringing some of the aspects of complexity theory into practice. Therefore, I consider Stacey’s ideas on how complexity theory challenges the implicit assumptions of systems thinking that underlie organization theory to be a poignant reflection on the fundamental issues inherent to the way organization theorists tend to think and write about organizations, although it seems to be that a distinction should be made between the mental models which organizational actors employ and their actual behavior. These may not match, meaning that what appears as a problem in discourse may be less of a problem in practice. His suggestion that we should no longer progress from the notion of an autonomous, disembedded individual, focusing instead on the fundamental interdependence of humans and the emergent processes produced by their interactions, is a strong one. I would concur that much of (neo)classical thinking is partial to the flaws Stacey indicates, although it is also true that organizational theorists more oriented towards a postmodernist and social constructivist approach do not use these models. In this regard, Complex Responsive Processes appears to be a promising approach, because it is able to avoid the reification of organization and re-establish it strongly where it belongs, in process and human interaction. It  seems to provide a lens or framework through which professionals working in/with organizations can better understand what is going on.  Nonetheless, I do have some criticism. It seems to me that Stacey exhibits some generalizing tendencies when it comes to discussing other theories of organization, whether they are rooted in complexity or not. His argument seems to be fixated on a small group of fallacious theories (such as cognitivism, cybernetics, dual causality), which 
52 
 
somehow seem to pop up as the underlying principles in every theory he reviews. For example, Stacey groups Argyris, Schein, Weick, Senge and Scharmer within learning organizations, claiming that they share a common background in humanist and constructivist psychology. It seems to me that these are theorists whose ideas differ in fundamental ways, even if they arguable do share some common assumptions. Also, I wonder whether Stacey does full justice to their theories. For example, when thinking about the Theory U framework (developed by Scharmer and Senge), it seems to me to be a theory which attempts to deal with least some of the issues Stacey raises. While I cannot discuss theory U in full detail here, it advocates, like Stacey’s complex responsive processes (CRP), a focus on process and dialogue, paying attention to interaction patterns and recognizing the processes of emergence which occur. It seems to me that in order for Stacey to be able to dismiss these theories based on insights from complexity theory, he should discuss them and their assumptions in more detail, noting also how they have attempted to deal with complexity and why this is unsuccessful. Also, I am not entirely convinced that, given the limitations of existing applications of complexity theory to organization theory, the framework of Complex Responsive Processes is an alternative able to both solve these issues and do full justice to  the insights complexity theory provides. In explaining his theory, Stacey makes little reference to the complexity theory he discusses in the previous chapters. It is interesting to note that in part III of his book (2007), which focuses on CRP, the word complexity is hardly mentioned. For providing the theoretical underpinnings of CRP, Stacey focuses heavily on the work of George Herbert Mead and Norbert Elias – who are a late 19th and early 20th century sociologist respectively – but does not refer to complexity theorists. What Stacey writes in these chapters also bears a striking resemblance to what he writes in his 2003 book, “Complexity and Group Processes: a radically social understanding of individuals”, in which the concept of organization is not incorporated at all. It’s as if Stacey first uses complexity theory to, in a grand sweeping gesture, “do away” with earlier organization theories. But once this operation has been completed, the complexity sciences fade into the background again, since they’re not necessary as a theoretical background for Stacey’s theory of CRP. It seems to me that Stacey, like many other writers about complexity and organization, is struggling to come up with a theory of complexity and organization that deals with complexity, but is still rooted in actorhood. This may not be surprising, since in the end, the way in which generalized complexity theory conceptualizes agents is strongly rooted in the natural sciences. Thus CRP seems to be a theory that, while it seems to be very compatible with complexity theory, is derived from the scientific paradigm 
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complexity theory aims to challenge. Since Stacey is so sensitive to issues of the theoretical/epistemological assumptions that inform organization theories, I find it somewhat strange that he does not approach Mead and Elias with the same critical distance, or tries to integrate CRP more fully with ideas coming from complexity science.  
2.6: Conclusion  In this chapter, I have tried to answer the question “What strategies have researchers used to apply ideas and methods from complexity science to the study of organizations? What could a theory of organization grounded in complexity science be like?” I conclude that different strategies have been used, which can be grouped in a general sense as objectivist or interpretivist. Objectivists favor models (such as ABM’s), employing a reductive strategy towards complexity, while interpretivists focus on exploring complexity through meaning and metaphors. I argue that objectivists strategies hold less promise than interpretivist ones, since reducing complexity means losing sight of it (which, as I have argued in the previous chapter, means losing the emergent characteristics of such a system). Also, approaches such as agent-based modeling lack the reflexivity towards epistemological issues which is a possible indicator of “faddism”.  Complexity may also be approached as a “generative metaphor”.  Although a metaphorical treatment of complexity may entail risks if it is not identified as such, achieving a unified interpretation and operationalization across complexity theory applied to organizations is probably impossible. Also, the history of organization studies shows that concepts may be imported from other fields first in a metaphorical way, achieving stronger empirical and theoretical grounding over time.  In order to explore the main question of this thesis “How can complexity theory be used to inform and/or challenge the study of organizations?”, I turn to the work of Ralph Stacey. I conclude that complexity theory can be used to inform and challenge the study of organization because it challenges the existing discourse of organization studies, putting to question fundamental assumptions such as that organizations are systems existing outside of human interaction, and that they can be subjected to rational planning and control through actors external to them.  I agree with Stacey that these assumptions are common to most organization theories associated with the first wave of systems thinking, such as strategic choice theory and learning organizations, and also to later second-wave systems thinking theories such as interactive planning and soft systems methodology.  I conclude that existing approaches to apply complexity theory to organization studies don’t take this into account sufficiently. In order 
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for complexity theory to be able to inform the study of organizations, new theories need to be developed. In order to answer the question of what a theory of organization grounded in complexity theory could look like,  I discuss Stacey’s alternative theory  “Complex Responsive Processes”. While I agree that this theory takes into account the challenges complexity theory presents to organization studies, I would argue that it needs to be rooted in complexity theory more fully in order to be able to qualify as a “complex theory of organization”. Nonetheless, I conclude his theory does provide a good basis for answering the question of how professionals in organizations can develop an attitude that allows them to better deal with complexity in practice, because it refocuses attention on the processes of daily, local interaction in which they as actors are embedded, which co-create the patterns behavior exhibited by the system as a whole.  In the following chapter, I will explore this question further through critical complexity theory.   
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Chapter 3: Normative aspects of complexity 
 In the previous chapters, I have first discussed complexity theory in a general sense, followed by describing the way in which complexity theory has so far been applied to organization theory. Afterwards I have provided an account of the way in which complexity theory can challenge and inform the discourse of organization studies, and what a theory of organization grounded in complexity theory could look like. I would now like to link these issues to the paradigm of critical complexity. I have several reasons for this. The first is that critical complexity theory points our attention to the fact that complexity theory has ethical and normative dimensions, the consequences of which are relevant for our daily lives.  Cilliers (Ibid., p.5) argues that the crises we are facing in the social, political, economic and environmental spheres today are due to the ‘disastrous effects of reductive thinking’, making this not just a theoretical issue, but a practical and normative one as well.  While I have described some of these ethical issues in a circumferential way in the previous chapters, I would like to explore them in further detail through discussing the strategies proposed to deal with them in critical complexity theory. I believe this will allow me to shed more light into the final question I have posed in this thesis, “How can professionals working with organizations, using insights from critical complexity theory, develop an attitude that allows them to better deal with complexity in practice?”, linking the questions explored in the field of humanistic studies and normative professionalization (such as how professionals can balance “systemic” and normative demands in daily practice)  to the issue of how complexity theory can be used to better understand organizations. This third sub-question is oriented toward the humanizing of organizations and institutions and the realization of the “good life within a just society.” 
 
3.1: Critical Complexity theory 
 Expounding views similar to those of Morin which I have discussed in the first chapter, Cilliers (2008, p. 4) notes that the traditional, “modernist” style of scientific thinking is no longer adequate, not because of a postmodernist reaction to modernity, but due to the increased complexity of the phenomena we are dealing with today. Pluralism, diversity, volatility and transgressivity are present in contemporary society in a much larger degree than they have been in the societies of the past. The three fundamental explanatory principles of classical science Morin notes (universal determinism, reduction and 
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disjunction) are not adequate for dealing with the increase in complexity we face today (think, for example, of processes of globalization, urbanization etc.). These ‘wicked problems’, show that complexity has now become an ontological property (Preiser, 2013, p. 12). They are impossible to solve because of their ‘incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements, which are often difficult to recognise’ (Ibid.). Because many of these problems are interdependent, trying to solve one aspect of such as problem is likely to reveal other problems. I would argue that this has important consequences for the attitude professionals working with organizations should take in dealing with complexity. Preiser (2013, p. 13) argues that under these conditions, we should think of complexity not as a problem which can be solved, but as a condition under which we live, and with which we should try to deal in the best way possible. Critical complexity then, acknowledges complexity as a fundamental, and concerns itself with how we should act when we are aware of this condition (Ibid., p. 15) Preiser (Ibid., p. 10) further notes that in order to be able to develop knowledge about complex systems, it is impossible in practice to avoid using reductionist strategies if we want to be able to say something about them.  What does this mean? When we try to understand a complex system, we cannot avoid thinking in models (for example, when forming a “mental picture” of an organization), which means a reduction of complexity, leaving part of the system out of consideration (Cilliers, 2008, p. 9). But because in a complex system, all parts work together to produce emergent behavior, that which we have left out of our model will still be influencing the system proper. This means that in essence, we can never have complete knowledge of a complex system. Furthermore, our knowledge of a complex system (such as an organization) cannot be presented as objective, since to apply a reductive operation is always to create a certain framework (Ibid., p. 9).  This means that knowledge about complex systems always needs to be thought of as provisional (Ibid., p. 9). Notice that this runs counter to the unproblematic and non-reflexive way in which knowledge about a system is thought of in most organization theories. Since knowledge can only come to be within a dynamic network of interactions, a dialectical relationship between knowledge and the system within which it is produced is proposed by Cilliers (Ibid., p. 10).  Which means we cannot present it as being objective. This does not mean that all knowledge about complex systems is impossible. But it does mean that this knowledge is always contextualized, e.g. co-determined, by our frameworks of selection. Since this contextualizing function entails making a choice (whether consciously admitted or not), the claims we make always have a normative dimension (Ibid.).  
57 
 
The question then becomes: if the knowledge on which we base our actions and decisions is always provisional and based on an incomplete understanding, how can we, as practitioners and professionals, decide what to do?  Since this is inevitable, Preiser argues that a reductionist logic must be developed which is aware of itself, called post-reductionism. What this entails is a reductionism which displays self-reflexivity, developing an awareness of it limits (Preiser, 2013, p. 11). But this reductionism amounts to a shift in attitude, where errors, blind spots and limitations are no longer concealed, but acknowledged (Ibid., p. 10) Cilliers proposes several principles for developing such an attitude. Together, they form a “provisional imperative”:  1. The essence of taking a truly critical position is to be aware of our ignorance and to admit it as such. (Cilliers, 2008, p. 10) 2. We should realize that as actors subject to complexity, we constitute each other and ourselves through a rich, non-linear network of interactions. What we choose to do is both determined by, and constitutive of our identities. (Ibid.).  If we take this argument seriously, it follows that we cannot disregard the normative content of our actions, for example by pointing to the demands made of us by instrumental or organizational rationality. Because while we may be influenced by these demands, we are also ourselves exerting an influence on them. We should judge our actions from the normative content we consider to be part of our identities, by asking the question “is this an action constitutive of the person I want myself to be?” 3. Cilliers proposes that we take a more modest attitude towards action in general. He is not suggesting that we should not act at all, but that we should do so with ‘care and provisionality’, being aware how our actions unfold in time (Ibid., p. 11). Thinking about how this notion can be used within the context of acting within organizations, I would argue that it calls for an increase in the reflexivity of actors in organizations and the ‘cultivation of a certain slowness’ (Cilliers, 2007)  Cilliers notes that the consequences he draws from complexity bear a striking resemblance to principles of postmodernism and deconstruction (cf. Cilliers, 1998 and 2007, p. 12). Citing Morin’s (2008) assertion that ‘humanity has two types of madness. One is obviously very visible, it's the madness of absolute incoherence, of onomatopoeia, of words spoken randomly. The other is much less visible: it is the madness of absolute 
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coherence. Against this second madness, the resource is self-critical rationality and recourse to experience’. (p. 48)  It is precisely because of the fundamental undecidability and ambiguity of the world to which critical complexity theory points that the claims of objectivity and certainty inherent in much of our thinking about organization needs to be put into question. Cilliers writes that otherness and difference should be respected as values in themselves. In a sense, this argument is similar to Stacey’s (2007, p. 446) that it is tolerance for diversity which allows novel forms of behavior to emerge in complex systems. And that therefore, paying attention to the “quality of diversity” is highly important.  Cilliers notes that even if we follow this “provisional imperative”, this does not mean we have a guarantee that our actions will have good consequences. Acknowledging that our actions always have an ethical dimension does not mean we are sure to make the right choices (Ibid., p. 14). But, progressing from a position of radical self-critique and the necessity of making our value judgments explicit (as opposed to resorting to claims of false objectivity) is an ethical strategy in and of itself. (Ibid.) For Cilliers then, this is the transgressive and transformative character of the ethical position complexity theory places us in.  
3.2: Conclusion  What does this mean for the question of how can professionals working with organizations can, using insights from critical complexity theory,  develop an attitude that allows them to better deal with complexity in practice?  Taking into account Cilliers’ position, I see a strong similarity between the principles he proposes for action under conditions of complexity and the guidelines Stacey proposes for practical action (cf. Stacey, 2007, p. 445-447). Guidelines such as learning to deal with undecidability and paradox, paying attention to the quality of diversity (not trying to reduce it too much) and focusing on the quality of participation (e.g., the patterns that emerge), seem to be strikingly similar. It seems to me that the combination of the guidelines proposed by Stacey and the principles proposed by Cilliers (admitting ignorance, increasing reflexivity, developing a more modest attitude towards action) provides a good framework for allowing professionals working within organizations and the field of organizational development to reflect about how they should act from a complexity-based understanding of organizations. More so because taken together they are rooted both in an understanding of complexity theory as applied to organization and in 
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complexity theory proper.  Although Stacey touches on the issues critical complexity theory points to with regards to the discourse of organization studies, it is radicalized in the work of Cilliers and Preiser as a strategy for practical action. While this strategy does not provide simple “if… then” guidelines, as some complexity thinkers may be tempted to try, it seems to me that the issues complexity theory raises cannot be answered by using such a simple, reductionist strategy. I believe that is made clear by the critique Stacey provides of existing approaches towards bringing complexity into organization studies. I conclude therefore that in order for normative professionals working within organizations to develop an attitude allowing them to better deal with complexity, besides being aware of the challenge complexity theory poses to organization theory, they should also acknowledge both of the principles for action proposed by Stacey in his theory of Complex Responsive Processes, and the “Provisional Imperative” proposed by Cilliers. They should reflect on how these principles relate to their attitude in daily practice, in order to become more aware of how they can act from a complexity-informed understanding of organizations.  This would not allow them to avoid using reductive strategies to understand complexity altogether, since this is impossible in practice, but it would allow them to be more aware of complexity as it runs through their daily lives. Although I am tempted to explore further what “dealing with complexity” may mean in practice, the reality is that there are no easy strategies or theories available for doing this. As I have noted in the previous chapter, presenting complexity in organizations as something which can be “dealt with” through strategies such as setting “simple rules”, or even as a tool which can be used to improve organizations, misunderstands the fundamental problems complexity poses. It seems to me that complexity in organizations calls for a modest and reflexive attitude, both because of the challenges it poses to thinking about organizations and the process of organization itself, and because of the fact that we do not seems to understand its structure very well yet.     
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Chapter 4: Conclusion  
4.1: Main conclusions  In this thesis I set out to answer the question “How can complexity theory be used to inform and/or challenge the study of organizations?” through three steps.  First, I have researched what the core ideas from the field of complexity science are, and in what way they can be relevant for the field of organization studies. I have found that the central idea of complexity theory is that systems (either natural, social or otherwise) in which certain characteristics occur can be called complex systems. The fact that in complex systems, internal order can emerge from the dynamic interaction of their parts without an overarching teleology or plan, means that they display adaptive self-organizing behavior. This also means that they cannot be analyzed using reductive methods, because once the interaction between the parts is lost, the behavior of the “whole” is lost as well. Organizations are likely complex systems, given that they consist of the interaction of a large number of parts (individual agents), which generate emergent self-organizing behavior on the level of the whole in response to changing boundary conditions. I have found several ideas at the core of complexity science which seem relevant for the study of organizations. These include that in complex systems, dis- or nonequilibrium can be a precondition for growth, that complex systems are open to their environment, being in part constitutive of their environment and being constituted by it, and the fact that complex systems display emergent behavior and self-organization.  Secondly, I have researched what strategies researchers have used to bring ideas and methods from complexity science to the study of organizations, also discussing some of the epistemological issues associated with this effort. I have found that these strategies can be grouped in a general sense as objectivist or interpretivist, based on whether they aim to reduce complexity or to explore it. I conclude that objectivist strategies hold less promise than interpretivist ones, since strategies aimed at reducing complexity risk losing sight of it. Also, associated approaches such as agent-based modeling lack a reflexivity towards the epistemological issues involved, which is an indicator of possible “faddism”.  In an interpretivist strategy complexity may rather be approached as a “generative metaphor”, aimed at generating an awareness of complexity and influence processes of (collective) meaning making in organizations.  Although a metaphorical treatment of complexity may entail risks if it is not identified as such, achieving a unified interpretation and operationalization of concepts in complexity theory used in organization studies is 
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probably impossible. Also, the history of organization studies shows that concepts that have been “imported” from other fields first in a metaphorical way can achieve stronger empirical and theoretical grounding over time. Therefore, I conclude that complexity can be fruitful for organization studies even when it lacks strong empirical grounding.  Thirdly, I have researched what the challenges are which complexity theory poses to existing theories in organization studies, and the discourse of which they are a part (the “challenge” in the main question of this thesis). I have also researched what a theory of organization grounded in complexity science could look like (the “inform” in the main question of this thesis). I conclude that complexity theory can be used to inform and challenge the study of organization through allowing a critical reflection on the existing discourse of organization studies, putting to question fundamental assumptions such as that organizations are systems existing outside of human interaction, and that they can be subjected to rational planning and control by actors external to them. These assumptions are common to most organization theories associated with the first wave of systems thinking, such as strategic choice theory and learning organizations, and also to later second-wave systems thinking theories such as interactive planning and soft systems methodology.  The existing approaches to apply complexity theory to organization studies also do not take this into account sufficiently, as Stacey discusses. Therefore, in order for complexity theory to be able to inform the study of organizations, new theories need to be developed. I believe Stacey’s theory of “Complex Responsive Processes” takes into account the challenges complexity theory presents to organization studies, although it needs to be rooted in complexity theory more fully in order to be able to qualify as a “complex theory of organization”. Nonetheless, I conclude that his theory does provide a good indication of how a theory of organization grounded in complexity theory might look like. It also provides a good point of departure for allowing professionals in organization to develop an awareness of complexity and attitude to work with it, because it refocuses attention from systemic perspectives to the processes of daily, local interaction in which these professionals are embedded as actors, co-creating the patterns behavior exhibited by the organization as a whole.   Fourthly, since I also wished to provide insights for those working with organizations who wish to use insights from complexity theory to better their daily practice, I’ve researched how professionals working with organizations can develop an attitude that allows them to better deal with complexity in practice through critical complexity theory.  Because pluralism, diversity, volatility and transgressivity are present in contemporary society in a much larger degree than they have been in the societies of 
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the past, ‘wicked problems’ are generated, which are often impossible to solve through classical scientific analysis due to of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements difficult to recognize. Because such problems are often interdependent, trying to solve one aspect of such as problem tends to result in revealing other problems. Complexity should therefore be seen not only as an objective or metaphorical property of systems, but also as an ontological property inherent to (modern) life itself. I conclude that under such conditions, complexity becomes a condition with which we should try to deal in the best way possible. The question thus is one of attitude: how can we best deal with complexity?  While no easy strategies or theories are available for this, the fact that we cannot avoid reducing complexity when thinking about it means that we should try to make this reductionism more self-reflexive.  This calls for an attitude based on the “provisional imperative” in which we are both aware of the limits to our understanding of complexity and admit them as such, acting with “care and provisionality”, aware of how our actions unfold in time. I conclude that since as actors in complex systems we constitute each other and ourselves through interactions, the choices we make feed back on ourselves. Which is why the normative content of our actions cannot be disregarded. We should judge our actions from the normative content we consider to be part of our identities, for example by asking the question “is this an action constitutive of the person I want myself to be?” What does this mean for actors working within organizations? I conclude that it calls for an increase in reflexivity. This would not allow them to avoid using reductive strategies to understand complexity altogether, but it would be able to become more aware of complexity as it runs through daily practice. There is a strong similarity between the principles Cilliers proposes for action under conditions of complexity, and the guidelines Stacey proposes. I conclude that by combining the guidelines proposed by Stacey and the “provisional imperative” suggested by Cilliers, and regularly reflecting on these in the context of their daily functioning, normative professionals can develop a complex-based understanding of organizations that will help them in working toward the “good life within a just society”. This may allow us to avoid some of the negative consequences associated with acting from ‘simple thought’ in organizations and other complex systems to which I have pointed in my introduction and chapter 2. Changing our attitude may slowly introduce changes we wish to see in the systems we deal with. 
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4.2: Theoretical and practical implications of the research 
 On the next page I present a “consequence matrix” which shows the result of my research for the study of organizations, both on the level of theory and the level of practice. It is intended as a summary and addition to the conclusions presented here. I differentiate between consequences for theorists and normative professionals for clarity’s sake, although it seems to me that the theoretical and ethical dimensions of complexity in organizations, and the work of organization theorists and practitioners are deeply intertwined. 
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Consequence matrix 
 
 
Because… 
The complexity of a 
complex system is 
irreducible, e.g. creating a 
valid model requires it to 
be at least as complex as 
the system itself. 
In a CAS, individual agents 
cannot be aware of what is 
happening to the system as 
a whole, unless the full 
complexity is present 
within them as well 
Self-organized behavior 
emerges at the level of a 
whole from rich local 
interactions at the level of 
the parts. 
In complex social systems, 
linear or “simple” 
causation cannot 
adequately explain many 
events. 
The theoretical 
consequences are that… 
 
(for organization 
theory/studies) 
Theorists cannot presume to be able to fully understand the behavior of organizations by building reductive (mental) models of them, much less predict their future states with certainty. Instead, they should focus attention on the knowledge embedded in the local interactions and sense making of organizational actors. (cf. Cilliers, 1998; Stacey, 2007) 
Theorists need to be aware that no objective ‘gods-eye perspective’ is possible: one’s understanding is always limited and situated. To research something is to become a part of it, which means that the agent, other agents and the system are mutually constitutive through complex responsive processes. (cf. Cilliers, 1998) 
Theorists need to let go of the dominance of the implicit ‘command and control’ paradigm, and try to incorporate the fact that much organizational behavior is the result of emergence into their theories. To believe into the possibility of simple top-down control entails an intellectual and ethical danger.  (cf. Stacey, 2007; van Uden, 2004) 
Theorists need to investigate the explanatory power of ‘complex causality’ for their theories. They need to be aware of the biases and limits inherent to the simple causation underlying classical organization theory.  (cf. Marion, 1999; Morin, 2008) 
The practical 
consequences are that… 
 
(for normative 
professionals working in 
and with organizations) 
Professionals working with organizations should be transparent about the limits of their understanding and predictive powers. The creation and use of (mental) models needs to be complemented by other approaches, such as narrativity and dialogical processes. (cf. Cilliers, 2008; Stacey, 2007; Brown, 2004) 
Professionals in organizations should work from the assumption that their own mental maps always need to be complemented by those of others. Trying to impose singular meaning through power is a futile effort. Furthermore, through self-organization, there will always be an ‘excess’ generating organization which cannot be readily incorporated understood. (cf. Stacey, 2007) 
Professionals working in organizations should not attempt to halt emergence, but focus on the local interaction processes and how they generate system-wide patterns. Through observing, facilitating and co-creating self-organization behavior from the local, some measure of influence is possible, although this does not offer a return to the concept of control rooted in classical organization theory. (cf. Stacey, 2007) 
Professionals in organizations should be aware of the “discursive limits” thinking from linear causality imposes on their potential for understanding organizational behavior. They should try to develop a ‘relational perspective’, which focuses on the interaction between the whole and its parts. (cf. Morin, 2008), 
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4.3: Limitations of the study, recommendations for further research 
 One limitation of this study is that it is based on an exploration of the available literature on the topics of complexity and organization studies, without involving empirical research into the questions proposed. This is not problematic for the main research question and first two sub-questions, since these are questions best answered through a literature review. For the third sub-question however, an empirical study could have been useful. For example, through qualitative research into how normative professionals deal with complexity in their practice now, and comparing this with what is suggested in the literature. Or to validate the results which came out of the literature review.  However, for this thesis such a study was not feasible due to the limited time and possibility of scope available. Furthermore, there is as of yet not much empirically grounded research into complexity in social systems. It seems to me that before such research can be meaningful, many epistemological issues need to be cleared up. Which is why I have researched these in some detail in this thesis. I would suggest that the results of this research lend themselves to be explored further through qualitative research. For example, by exploring whether the limitations and issues which can be identified in existing theories of organizations through using complexity theory are also confirmed by the practical experiences of actors in organizations when their actions are based on them. Another limitation of this study is that I  have not been able to discuss these existing theories of organization (whether they involve ideas from complexity theory or not) in full detail. To explore to what extent the issues complexity theory points to appear in other recent theories of organization (such as Theory U), and if so, how they have been dealt with, seems to me an area of potentially fruitful literature research. More so because the results of this can then be compared with the work of Ralph Stacey, or other theorists in the field of complexity and organizations.  Despite these limitations, it seems to me that this thesis gives a good overview of the topic of complexity theory and its potential for the study of organizations, providing a perspective that is both wide and deep. Wide in the sense that complexity theory and associated concepts, the way in which attempts have been made to bring its insights to the study of organization, and its potential for informing the work of normative professionals in organizations have been explored in some detail. And deep in the sense that the challenge complexity theory presents to the existing discourse of organization studies and the possible ways in which a theory of organization grounded in complexity can be developed have been explored as well.  Nonetheless, there is still a great deal to be studied. 
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4.4: In closing  How then, can complexity theory inform and challenge the study of organizations? I conclude that complexity theory can be used to inform and challenge the study of organization because it challenges the existing discourse of organization studies, putting to question fundamental assumptions such as that organizations are systems existing outside of human interaction, and that they can be subjected to rational planning and control through actors external to them.  Furthermore, while I would argue that complexity theory does, as of yet, provide a “theory of organization to end all others”, I believe it is useful for the study of organizations in at least three ways:  1. When taking the insights provided by complexity theory seriously, it can be used as a sieve through which a theory of organization, or an organization theorist can be critically evaluated. For example, does he/she and his/her theory take into account phenomena such as emergence, adaptive responsiveness, and self-organization? Does it respond to the complex causal patterns evident in organizations? Or does it (taking into account Stacey’s warning) reiterate notions of ‘command and control’? This is especially important in light of the normative aspects of complexity which Cilliers has highlighted. 2. Insights and concepts from complexity theory can be used as a “generative metaphor” in the practice of normative professionals involved in organizational development. It may be used to elicit new practices of meaning making that increase understanding of organizations. For example, allowing us to better understand why organizations tend to be “resistant to change” unless certain boundary conditions have been met (a system attempting to maintain equilibrium, until this is no longer feasible and it reorganizes), or how when a group of managers tries to implement a change of strategy, the end result will often be very different from what they envisioned originally 3. It could form the basis of a new theory or theories of organization that is more rooted in process. Stacey’s CRP is an interesting approach to this, although it seems to me to lack grounding in complexity theory proper. I would propose that such theories should be developed further, also on the basis of empirical research. However, I would argue that such theories should not conceptualize complexity as something which can be used or implemented at will, but as a property of the world in which we live in and its systems, as critical complexity theory shows. 
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Though we may be able to “work with” complexity through developing certain strategies, when we attempt to reduce it we run the risk of losing sight of precisely that which complexity illuminates, which is to say the fundamental unpredictability and undecidability of the world. I would argue that in this case, the medicine (the illusion of control) is worse than the disease. It seems to me that complexity in organizations calls for a modest and reflexive attitude, both because of the challenges it poses to thinking about organizations and the process of organization itself, and because of the fact that we do not yet seems to understand its full potential consequences.                           
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